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An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic
equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an in-
centive to deviate from it. This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have
been proposed as formalizations of this requirement and of the properties and the
applications of these concepts. In particular the paper discusses Nash equilibrium,
together with its main coarsenings (correlated equilibrium, rationalizibility) and
its main re…nements (sequential, perfect, proper, persistent and stable equilibria).
There is also an extensive discussion on equilibrium selection.
¤This paper was written in 1994, and no attempt has been made to provide a survey of the devel-
opments since then. The author thanks two anonymous referees and the editors for their comments.
1 Introduction
It has been said that “the basic task of game theory is to tell us what strategies ratio-
nal players will follow and what expectations they can rationally entertain about other
rational players’ strategies” (Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 342)). To construct such
a theory of rational behavior for interactive decision situations, game theorists proceed
in an indirect, roundabout way, as suggested in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944,
§17.3). The analyst assumes that a satisfactory theory of rational behavior exists and
tries to deduce which outcomes are consistent with such a theory. A fundamental re-
quirement is that the theory should not be self-defeating, i.e. players who know the
theory should have no incentive to deviate from the behavior that the theory recom-
mends. For noncooperative games, i.e. games in which there is no external mechanism
available for the enforcement of agreements or commitments, this requirement implies
that the recommendation has to be self-enforcing. Hence, if the participants act inde-
pendently and if the theory recommends a unique strategy for each player, the pro…le
of recommendations has to be a Nash equilibrium: The strategy that is assigned to a
player must be optimal for this player when the other players follow the strategies that
are assigned to them. As Nash writes
“By using the principles that a rational prediction should be unique, that
the players should be able to make use of it, and that such knowledge on
the part of each player of what to expect the others to do should not lead
him to act out of conformity with the prediction, one is led to the concept”
(Nash (1950a)).
Hence, a satisfactory normative theory that advises people how to play games neces-
sarily must prescribe a Nash equilibrium in each game. Consequently, one wants to
know whether Nash equilibria exist and what properties they have. These questions are
addressed in the next section of this paper. In that section we also discuss the concept
of rationalizability, which imposes necessary requirements for a satisfactory set-valued
theory of rationality. A second immediate question is whether a satisfactory theory can
prescribe just any Nash equilibrium, i.e. whether all Nash equilibria are self-enforcing.
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Simple examples of extensive form games have shown that the answer to this question is
no: Some equilibria are sustained only by incredible threats and, hence, are not viable
as the expectation that a rational player will carry out an irrational (nonmaximizing)
action is irrational. This observation has stimulated the search for more re…ned equilib-
rium notions that aim to formalize additional necessary conditions for self-enforcingness.
A major part of this paper is devoted to a survey of the most important of these so-
called re…nements of the Nash equilibrium concept. (See Shubik in colume III of this
Handbook) for a general critique on this re…nement program.)
In Section 3 the emphasis is on extensive form solution concepts that aim to capture
the idea of backward induction, i.e. the idea that rational players should be assumed
to be forward-looking and to be motivated to reach their goals in the future, no matter
what happened in the past. The concepts of subgame perfect, sequential, perfect and
proper equilibria that are discussed in Section 3 can all be viewed as formalizations of
this basic idea. Backward induction, however, is only one aspect of self-enforcingness,
and it turns out that it is not su¢cient to guarantee the latter. Therefore, in Section
4 we turn to another aspect of self-enforcingness, that of forward induction. We will
discuss stability concepts that aim at formalizing this idea, i.e. that actions taken by
rational actors in the past should be interpreted, whenever possible, as being part of
a grand plan that is globally optimal. As these concepts are related to the notion of
persistent equilibrium, we will have an opportunity to discuss this latter concept as well.
Furthermore, as these ideas are most easily discussed in the normal form of the game, we
take a normal-form perspective in Section 4. As the concepts discussed in this section
are set-valued solution concepts, we will also discuss the extent to which set-valuedness
contradicts the uniqueness of the rational prediction as postulated by Nash in the above
quotation.
The fact that many games have multiple equilibria poses a serious problem for the “the-
ory” rationale of Nash equilibrium discussed above. It seems that, for Nash’s argument
to make sense, the theory has to select a unique equilibrium in each game. However,
how can a rational prediction be unique if the game has multiple equilibria? How can
one rationally select an equilibrium? A general approach to this latter problem has
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been proposed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and Section 5 is devoted to an overview
of that theory as well as a more detailed discussion of some of its main elements, such as
the tracing procedure and the notion of risk-dominance. We also discuss some related
theories of equilibrium selection in that section and show that the various elements of
self-enforcingness that are identi…ed in the various sections may easily be in con‡ict;
hence, the search for a universal solution concept for non-cooperative games may con-
tinue in the future.
I conclude this introduction with some remarks concerning the (limited) scope of this
chapter. As the Handbook contains an entire chapter on the conceptual foundations of
strategic equilibrium (Hillas and Kohlberg in volume III of this Handbook ), there are
few remarks on this topic in the present chapter. I do not discuss the epistemic conditions
needed to justify Nash equilibrium (see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)), nor how
an equilibrium can be reached. I’ll focus on the formal de…nitions and mathematical
properties of the concepts. Throughout, attention will be restricted to …nite games, i.e.
games in which the number of players as well as the action set of each of these players
is …nite. It should also be stressed that several other completely di¤erent rationales
have been advanced for Nash equilibria, and that these are not discussed at all in this
chapter. Nash (1950a) already discussed the “mass-action” interpretation of equilibria,
i.e. that equilibria can result when the game is repeatedly played by myopic players
who learn over time. I refer to Fudenberg and Levine (1998), and the papers cited
therein for a discussion of the contexts in which learning processes can be expected
to converge to Nash equilibria. Maynard Smith and Price (1973) showed that Nash
equilibria can result as outcomes of evolutionary processes that wipe out less …t strategies
through time. I refer to Hammerstein and Selten (1994) and Van Damme (1994) for
a discussion of the role of Nash equilibrium in the biological branch of game theory,
and to Samuelson (1997), Vega-Redondo (1996) and Weibull (1995) for more general
discussions on evolutionary processes in games.
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2 Nash Equilibria in normal form games
2.1 Generalities
A (…nite) game in normal form is a tuple g = (A; u) where A = A1 £ ::: £ AI is a
Cartesian product of …nite sets and u = (u1; :::; uI) is an I-tuple of functions ui : A ! R.
The set I = f1; :::; Ig is the set of players, Ai is the set of pure strategies of player i
and ui is this player’s payo¤ function. Such a game is played as follows: Simultaneously
and independently players choose strategies; if the combination a 2 A results, then each
player i receives ui(a). A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution si on Ai
and we write Si for the set of such mixed strategies, hence
Si = fsi : Ai ! R+;
X
ai2Ai
si(ai) = 1g: (2.1)
(Generally, if C is any …nite set, ¢(C) denotes the set of probability distributions on
C, hence, Si = ¢(Ai)). A mixed strategy may be interpreted as an act of deliberate
randomization of player i or as a probability assessment of some player j 6= i about
how i is going to play. We return to these di¤erent interpretations below. We identify
ai 2 Ai with the mixed strategy that assigns probability 1 to ai. We will write S for the
set of mixed strategy pro…les, S = S1 £ ::: £ SI , with s denoting a generic element of
S. Note that when strategies are interpreted as beliefs, taking strategy pro…les as the
primitive concept entails the implicit assumption that any two opponents j; k of player i
have a common belief si about which pure action i will take. Alternatively, interpreting
s as a pro…le of deliberate acts of randomization, the expected payo¤ to i when s 2 S







If s 2 S and s0i 2 Si, then sns0i denotes the strategy pro…le in which each j 6= i plays
sj while i plays s0i. Occasionally we also write sns0i = (s¡i; s0i), hence, s¡i denotes the












and the set of all such best replies is denoted as Bi(s). Obviously, Bi(s) only depends
on s¡i, hence, we can also view Bi as a correspondence from S¡i to Si. If we write Bi(s)
for the set of pure best replies against s, hence Bi(s) = Bi(s)\Ai, then obviously Bi(s)
is the convex hull of Bi(s). We write B(s) = B1(s)£ ::: £BI(s) and refer to B : S ! S
as the best-reply correspondence associated with g. The pure best reply correspondence
is denoted by B, hence B = B \A.
2.2 Self-enforcing theories of rationality
We now turn to solution concepts that try to capture the idea of a theory of rational
behavior being self-enforcing. We assume that it is common knowledge that players are
rational in the Bayesian sense, i.e. whenever a player faces uncertainty, he constructs
subjective beliefs representing that uncertainty and chooses an action that maximizes his
subjective expected payo¤s. We proceed in the indirect way outlined in Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944, §17.3). We assume that a self-enforcing theory of rationality
exists and investigate its consequences, i.e. we try to determine the theory from its
necessary implications. The …rst idea for a solution of the game g is a de…nite strategy
recommendation for each player, i.e. some a 2 A. Already in simple examples like
matching pennies, however, no such simple theory can be self-enforcing: There is no
a 2 A that satis…es a 2 B(a), hence, there is always at least one player who has an
incentive to deviate from the strategy that the theory recommends for him. Hence, a
general theory of rationality, if one exists, must be more complicated.
Let us now investigate the possibilities for a theory that may recommend more than
one action for each player. Let Ci ½ Ai be the nonempty set of actions that the
theory recommends for player i in the game g and assume that the theory, i.e. the set
C = XiCi, is common knowledge among the players. If jCjj > 1, then player i faces
uncertainty about player j’s action, hence, he will have beliefs sij 2 Sj about what j
will do. Assuming beliefs associated with di¤erent opponents to be independent, we
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can represent player i’s beliefs by a mixed strategy vector si 2 S¡i. (Below we also
discuss the case of correlated beliefs; a referee remarked that he considered that to be
the more relevant case.) The crucial question now is which beliefs can player i rationally
entertain about an opponent j. If the theory C is self-enforcing, then no player j has
an incentive to choose an action that is not recommended, hence, player i should assign
zero possibility to any aj 2 AjnCj. Writing Cj(sj) for the support of sj 2 Sj,
Cj(sj) = faj 2 Aj : sj(aj) > 0g; (2.4)
we can write this requirement as
Cj(s
i
j) ½ Cj for all i; j: (2.5)
The remaining question is whether all beliefs sij satisfying (2.5) should be allowed, i.e.
whether i’s beliefs about j can be represented by the set ¢(Cj): One might argue yes:
If the opponents of j had an argument to exclude some aj 2 Cj , our theory would not
be very convincing; the players would have a better theory available (simply replace
Cj by Cjnfajg). Hence, let us insist that all beliefs sij satisfying (2.5) are allowed.
Being Bayesian rational, player i will choose a best response against his beliefs si. His
opponents, although not necessarily knowing his beliefs, know that he behaves in this
way, hence, they know that he will choose an action in the set
Bi(C) =
[
fBi(si) : sij 2 ¢(Cj) for all jg: (2.6)
Write B(C) = XiBi(C). A necessary requirement for C to be self-enforcing now is that
C ½ B(C): (2.7)
For, if there exists some i 2 I and some ai 2 Ai with ai 2 CinBi(C), then the opponents
know that player i will not play ai, but then they should assign probability zero to
ai, contradicting the assumption made just below (2.5). Write 2A for the collection of
subsets of A. Obviously, 2A is a …nite, complete lattice and the mapping B : 2A ! 2A
(de…ned by (2.6) and B(;) = ;) is monotonic. Hence, it follows from Tarski’s …xed point
theorem (Tarski (1955)), or by direct veri…cation that
(i) there exists a nonempty set C satisfying (2.7),
7
(ii) the set of all sets satisfying (2.7) is again a complete lattice, and
(iii) the union of all sets C satisfying (2.7), to be denoted R, is a …xed point of B, i.e.
R = B(R), hence, R is the largest …xed point.
The set R is known as the set of pure rationalizable strategy pro…les in g (Bernheim
(1984), Pearce (1984)). It follows by the above arguments that any self-enforcing set-
valued theory of rationality has to be a subset of R and that R itself is such a theory.
The reader can also easily check that R can be found by repeatedly eliminating the
non-best responses from g, hence




It is tempting to argue that, for C to be self-enforcing, it is not only necessary that (2.7)
holds, but also that conversely
B(C) ½ C; (2.9)
hence, that C actually must be a …xed point of B. The argument would be that, if
(2.9) did not hold and if ai 2 Bi(C)nCi, player i could conceivably play ai, hence, his
opponents should assign positive probability to ai. This argument, however, relies on
the assumption that a rational player can play any best response. Since not all best
responses might be equally good (some might be dominated, inadmissible, inferior or
non-robust (terms that are de…ned below)), it is not completely convincing. We note
that sets with the property (2.9) have been introduced in Basu and Weibull (1991) under
the name of curb sets. (Curb is mnemonic for closed under rational behavior.) The set
of all sets satisfying (2.9) is a complete lattice, i.e. there are minimal nonempty elements
and such minimal elements are …xed points. (Fixed points are called tight curb sets in
Basu and Weibull (1991).) We will encounter this concept again in Section 4.
Above we allowed two di¤erent opponents i and k to have di¤erent beliefs about player
j, hence sij 6= skj . In such situations one should actually discuss the beliefs that i has
about k’s beliefs. To avoid discussing such higher-order beliefs, let us assume that
players’ beliefs are summarized by one strategy vector s 2 S, hence we are discussing
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a theory that recommends a unique mixed strategy vector. For such a theory s to be
self-enforcing, we obtain, arguing exactly as above, as a necessary requirement
C(s) ½ B(s) (2.10)
where C(s) = XiCi(si), hence, each player believes that each opponent will play a best
response against his beliefs. A condition equivalent to (2.10) is




ui(sns0i) for all i 2 I: (2.12)
A strategy vector s satisfying these conditions is called a Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950b,
1951)). A standard application of Kakutani’s …xed point theorem yields:
Theorem 1 (Nash (1950b, 1951)). Every (…nite) normal form game has at least one
Nash equilibrium.
We note that Nash (1951) provides an elegant proof that relies directly on Brouwer’s
…xed point theorem. We have already seen that some games only admit equilibria in
mixed strategies. Dresher (1970) has computed that a large game with randomly drawn
payo¤s has a pure equilibrium with probability 1¡1=e. More recently, Stanford (1995)
has derived a formula for the probability that a randomly selected game has exactly k
pure equilibria. Gul et al. (1993) have shown that, for generic games , if there are k ¸ 1
pure equilibria, then the number of mixed equilibria is at least 2k¡ 1, a result to which
we return below. An important class of games that admit pure equilibria are potential
games (Monderer and Shapley (1996)). A function P : A ! R is said to be an ordinal
potential of g = hA; ui if for every a 2 A; i 2 I and a0i 2 Ai
ui(a)¡ ui(ana0i) > 0 i¤ P (a) ¡ P (ana0i) > 0: (2.13)
Hence, if (2.13) holds, then g is ordinally equivalent to a game with common payo¤s
and any maximizer of the potential P is a pure equilibrium of g. Consequently, a game
g that has an ordinal potential, has a pure equilibrium. Note that g may have pure
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equilibria that do not maximize P and that there may be mixed equilibria as well. The
function P is said to be an exact potential for g if
ui(a)¡ ui(ana0i) = P (a)¡ P (ana0i) (2.14)
and Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that such an exact potential, when it exists, is
unique up to an additive constant. Hence, the set of all maximizers of the potential is
a well-de…ned re…nement. Neyman (1995) shows that if the multilinear extension of P
from A to S (as in (2.2)) is concave and continuously di¤erentiable, every equilibrium of
g is pure and is a maximizer of the potential. Another class of games, with important ap-
plications in economics, that admit pure strategy equilibria are games with strategic com-
plementaries (Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1991), Milgrom
and Shannon (1994)). These are games in which each Ai can be ordered so that it forms
a complete lattice and in which each player’s best-response correspondence is monoton-
ically nondecreasing in the opponents’ strategy combination. The latter is guaranteed if
each ui is supermodular in ai (i.e. ui(ai; a¡i)+ui(a0i; a¡i)  ui(ai^a0i; a¡i)+ui(ai_a0i; a¡i))
and has increasing di¤erences in (a0i; a¡i) (i.e. if a¡i ¸ a0¡i, then ui(ai; a¡i)¡ui(ai; a0¡i) is
increasing in ai). Topkis (1979) shows that such a game has at least one pure equilibrium
and that there exists a largest and a smallest equilibrium, ¹a and a respectively. Milgrom
and Roberts (1990, 1991) show that ¹ai (resp. ai) is the largest (resp. smallest) serially
undominated action of each player i, hence, by iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies, the game can be reduced to the interval [a; ¹a]. It follows that, if a game with
strategic complementarities has a unique equilibrium, it is dominance-solvable, hence,
that only the unique equilibrium strategies are rationalizable.
An equilibrium s¤ is called strict if it is the unique best reply against itself, hence
fs¤g = B(s¤). Obviously, strict equilibria are necessarily in pure strategies, conse-
quently they need not exist. An equilibrium s¤ is called quasi-strict if all pure best
replies are chosen with positive probability in s¤, that is, if ai 2 Bi(s¤), then s¤i (ai) > 0.
Also, quasi-strict equilibria need not exist: Van Damme (1987a, p. 56) gives a 3-player
example. Norde (1999) has shown, however, that quasi-strict equilibria do exist in 2-
person games.
10
An axiomatization of the Nash concept, using the notion of consistency, has been pro-
vided in Peleg and Tijs (1996). Given a name g, a strategy pro…le s and a coalition of
players C, de…ne the reduced game gC;s as the game that results from g if the players
in InC are committed to play strategies as prescribed by s. A family of games ¡ is
called closed if all possible reduced games, of games in ¡, again belong to ¡. A solution
concept on ¡ is a map ' that associates to each g in ¡ a non-empty set of strategy
pro…les in g. ' is said to satisfy one-person rationality (OPR) if in every one-person
game it selects all payo¤ maximizing actions. On a closed set of games ¡, ' is said to
be consistent (CONS) if, for every g in ¡ and s and C: if s 2 '(g), then sC 2 '(gC;s),
in other words, if some players are committed to play a solution, the remaining players
…nd that the solution prescribed to them is a solution for their reduced game. Finally, a
solution concept ' on a closed set ¡ is said to satisfy converse consistency (COCONS) if,
whenever s is such that sC 2 '(gC;s) for all C 6= Á, then also s 2 '(g); in other words,
if the pro…le is a solution in all reduced games, then it is also a solution in the overall
game. Peleg and Tijs (1966, Theorem 2.12) show that, on any closed family of games,
the Nash equilibrium correspondence is characterized by the axioms OPR, CONS and
COCONS.
Next, let us brie‡y turn to the assumption that strategy sets are …nite. We note, …rst of
all, that Theorem 1 can be extended to games in which the strategy setsAi are nonempty,
compact subsets of some …nite-dimensional Euclidean space and the payo¤ functions ui
are continuous (Glicksberg (1952)). If, in addition, Ai is convex and ui is quasi-concave
in ai, there exists a pure equilibrium. Existence theorems for discontinuous games
have been given in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon and Zame (1990). In the
latter paper it is pointed out that discontinuities typically arise from indeterminacies in
the underlying (economic) problem and that these may be resolved by formulating an
endogenous sharing rule. In this paper, emphasis will be on …nite games. All games will
be assumed …nite, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
To conclude this subsection, we brie‡y return to the independence assumption that un-
derlies the above discussion, i.e. the assumption that player i represents his uncertainty
about his opponents by a mixed strategy vector si 2 S¡i. A similar development is pos-
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sible if we allow for correlation. In that case, (2.8) will be replaced by the procedure of
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and the analogous concept to (2.9)
is that of formations (Harsanyi and Selten (1988), see also Section 5). The concept that
corresponds to the parallel version of (2.12) is that of correlated equilibrium, Aumann
(1974). Formally, if ¾ is a correlated strategy pro…le (i.e. ¾ is a probability distribution
on A, ¾ 2 ¢(A)), then ¾ is a correlated equilibrium if for each player i and each ai 2 Ai






¾¡i(a¡ijai)ui(a¡i; a0i) for all a0i 2 Ai
where ¾i(ai) denotes the marginal probability of ai and where ¾¡i(a¡ijai) is the con-
ditional probability of a¡i given ai. One interpretation is as follows. Assume that an
impartial mediator (a person or machine through which the players communicate) se-
lects an outcome (a recommendation) a 2 A according to ¾ and then informs each
player i privately about this player’s personal recommendation ai. If the above condi-
tions hold, then, assuming that the opponents will always follow their recommendations,
no player has any incentive to deviate from his recommendation, no matter what ¾ may
recommend to him, hence, the recommendation ¾ is self-enforcing. Note that correlated
equilibrium allows for private communication between the mediator and each player i:
After hearing his recommendation ai, player i does not necessarily know what action
has been recommended to j, and two players i and k may have di¤erent posterior beliefs
about what j will do. Aumann (1974) shows that a correlated equilibrium is nothing
but a Nash equilibrium of an extended game in which the possibilities for communicat-
ing and correlating have been explicitly modeled, so in a certain sense there is nothing
new here, but, of course, working with a reduced form solution concept may have its
advantages. More importantly, Aumann (1987a) argues that correlated beliefs arise
naturally and he shows that, if it is common knowledge that each player is rational (in
the Bayesian sense) and if players analyse the game by using a common prior, then
the resulting distribution over outcomes must be a correlated equilibrium. Obviously,
each Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium, so that existence is guaranteed. An
elementary proof of existence, which uses the fact that the set of correlated equilibria
is a polyhedral set, has been given in Hart and Schmeidler (1989). Moulin and Vial
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(1978) gives an example of a correlated equilibrium with a payo¤ that is outside the
convex hull of the Nash equilibrium payo¤s, thus showing that players may bene…t from
communication with the mediator not being public. Myerson (1986) shows that, in ex-
tensive games, the timing of communication becomes of utmost importance. For more
extensive discussion on communication and correlation in games, we refer to Myerson’s
chapter 24 in this Handbook.
2.3 Structure, regularity and generic …niteness
For a game g we write E(g) for the set of its Nash equilibria. It follows from (2.10) that
E(g) can be described by a …nite number of polynomial inequalities, hence, E(g) is a
semi-algebraic set. Consequently, E(g) has a …nite triangulation, hence
Theorem 2 (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Proposition 1)). The set of Nash equilibria
of a game consists of …nitely many connected components.
Two equilibria s; s0 of g are said to be interchangeable if, for each i 2 I , also sns0i and s0nsi
are equilibria of g. Nash (1951) de…ned a subsolution as a maximal set of interchangeable
equilibria and he called a game solvable if all its equilibria are interchangeable. Nash
proved that each subsolution is a closed and convex set, in fact, that it is a product of
polyhedral sets. Subsolutions need not be disjoint and a game may have uncountably
many subsolutions (Chin et al. (1974)). In the 2-person case, however, there are only
…nitely many subsolutions (Jansen (1981)). A special class of solvable games is the
2-person zero-sum games, i.e. u1+u2 = 0. For such games, all equilibria yield the same
payo¤, the so-called value of the game, and a strategy is an equilibrium strategy if and
only if it is a minmax strategy. The reader is referred to chapter 20 in this Handbook
for a more extensive discussion on zero-sum 2-person games.
Let us now take a global perspective. Write ¡ = ¡A for the set of all normal form
games g with strategy space A = A1 £ ::: £ AI . Obviously, ¡ = RI£A, a …nite-
dimensional linear space. Write E for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence,
hence, E = f(g; s) 2 ¡ £ S : s 2 E(g)g. Kohlberg and Mertens have shown that this
graph E is itself a relatively simple object as it is homeomorphic to the space of games ¡.
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Kohlberg and Mertens show that the graph E (when compacti…ed by adding a point 1)
looks like a deformation of a rubber sphere around the (similarly compacti…ed) sphere
of games. Hence, the graph is “simple”, it just has folds, there are no holes, gaps or
knots. Formally
Theorem 3 (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Theorem 1)). Let ¼ be the projection from E
to ¡. Then there exists a homeomorphism ' from ¡ to E such that ¼ ±' is homotopic to
the identity on ¡ under a homotopy that extends from ¡ to its one-point compacti…cation
¹¡.
Kohlberg and Mertens use Theorem 3 to show that each game has at least one compo-
nent of equilibria that does not vanish entirely when the payo¤s of the game are slightly
perturbed, a result that we will further discuss in Section 4. We now move on to show
that the graph E is really simple as generically (i.e. except on a closed set of games
with measure zero) the equilibrium correspondence consists of a …nite (odd) number of
di¤erentiable functions. We proceed in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973a), but follow the
more elegant elaboration of Ritzberger (1994). At the end of the subsection, we brie‡y
discuss some related recent work that provides a more general perspective.
Obviously, if s is a Nash equilibrium of g, then s is a solution to the following system
of equations
si(ai)[ui(snai)¡ ui(s)] = 0 all i 2 I; ai 2 Ai: (2.15)
(The system (2.15) also admits solutions that are not equilibria - for example, any pure
strategy vector is a solution - but this fact need not bother us at present.) For each
player i, one equation in (2.15) is redundant; it is automatically satis…ed if the others
are. If we select, for each player i, one strategy ¹ai 2 Ai and delete the corresponding
equation, we are left with m =
P
i jAij ¡ I equations. Similarly we can delete the
variable si(¹ai) for each i as it can be recovered from the constraint that probabilities
add up to one. Hence, (2.15) reduces to a system of m equations with m unknowns.
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Taking each pair (i; a) with i 2 I and a 2 Ainf¹aig as a coordinate, we can view S as a
subset of Rm and the left-hand side of (2.15) as a mapping from S to Rm, hence
fiai(s) = si(ai)[ui(snai)¡ ui(s)] i 2 I; ai 2 Ainf¹aig: (2.16)
Write @f(s) for the Jacobian matrix of partial derivates of f evaluated at s and j@f(s)j
for its determinant. We say that s is a regular equilibrium of g if j@f(s)j 6= 0, hence,
if the Jacobian is nonsingular. The reader easily checks that for all i 2 I and ai 2 Ai,
if si(ai) = 0, then ui(snai) ¡ ui(s) is an eigenvalue of @f (s), hence, it follows that a
regular equilibrium is necessarily quasi-strict. Furthermore, if s is a strict equilibrium,
the above observation identi…esm (hence, all) eigenvalues, so that any strict equilibrium
is regular. A straightforward application of the implicit function theorem yields that, if
s¤ is a regular equilibrium of a game g¤, there exist neighborhoods U of g¤ in ¡ and V of
s¤ in S and a continuous map s : U ! V with s(g¤) = s¤ and fs(g)g = E(g)\ V for all
g 2 U . Hence, if s¤ is a regular equilibrium of g¤, then around (g¤; s¤) the equilibrium
graph E looks like a continuous curve. By using Sard’s theorem (in the manner initiated
in Debreu (1972)) Harsanyi showed that for almost all normal form games all equilibria
are regular. Formally, the proof proceeds by constructing a subspace ~¡ of ¡ and a
polynomial map ' : ~¡ £ S ! ¡ with the following properties (where ~g denotes the
projection of g in ~¡):
1. '(~g; s) = g if s 2 E(g)
2. j@'(~g; s)j = 0 if and only if j@f (s)j = 0.
Hence, if s is an irregular equilibrium of g, then g is a critical value of ' and Sard’s
theorem guarantees that the set of such critical values has measure zero. (For further
details we refer to Harsanyi (1973a) and Van Damme (1987a).) We summarize the above
discussion in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4 (Harsanyi (1973a)). Almost all normal form games are regular, that is,
they have only regular equilibria. Around a regular game, the equilibrium correspondence
consists of a …nite number of continuous functions. Any strict equilibrium is regular and
any regular equilibrium is quasi-strict.
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Note that Theorem 4 may be of limited value for games given originally in extensive form.
Any such nontrivial extensive form gives rise to a strategic form that is not in general
position, hence, that is not regular. We will return to generic properties associated with
extensive form games in Section 4. We will now show that the …niteness mentioned in
Theorem 4 can be strengthened to oddness. Again we trace the footsteps of Harsanyi
(1973a) with minor modi…cations as suggested by Ritzberger (1994), a paper that in
turn builds on Dierker (1972).
Consider a regular game g and add to it a logarithmic penalty term so that the payo¤
to i resulting from s becomes
u"i (s) = ui(s) + "
X
ai2Ai
lnsi(ai) (i 2 I; s 2 S): (2.17)
Obviously, an equilibrium of this game has to be in completely mixed strategies. (Since
the payo¤ function is not multilinear, (2.10) and (2.12) are no longer equivalent; by an
equilibrium we mean a strategy vector satisfying (2.12) with ui replaced by u"i . It follows
easily from Kakutani’s theorem that an equilibrium exists.) Hence, the necessary and
su¢cient conditions for equilibrium are given by the …rst order conditions:
f "iai(s) = fiai(s) + "(1¡ jAijsi(ai)) = 0 i 2 I; ai 2 Ainf¹aig: (2.18)
Because of the regularity of g, g has …nitely many equilibria, say s1; :::; sK . The im-
plicit function theorem tells us that for small ", system (2.18) has at least K solutions
fsk(")gKk=1 with sk(") ! sk as " ! 0. In fact there must be exactly K solutions for
small ": Because of regularity there cannot be two solution curves converging to the
same sk, and if a solution curve remained bounded away from the set fs1; :::; sKg, then
it would have a cluster point and this would be an equilibrium of g. However, the latter
is impossible since we have assumed g to be regular. Hence, if " is small, f " has exactly
as many zero’s as g has equilibria. An application of the Poincaré-Hopf Theorem for
manifolds with boundary shows that each f " has an odd number of zero’s, hence, g has
an odd number of equilibria. (To apply the Poincaré-Hopf Theorem, take a smooth
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approximation to the boundary of S, for example,
S(±) = fs 2 S;
Y
ai2Ai
si(ai) ¸ ± all ig: (2.19)
Then the Euler characteristic of S(±) is equal to 1 and, for …xed ", if ± is su¢ciently
small, f " points outward at the boundary of S(±):) To summarize, we have shown:
Theorem 5 (Harsanyi (1973a), Wilson (1971), Rosenmüller (1971)). Generic strate-
gic form games have an odd number of equilibria.
Ritzberger notes that actually we can say a little more. Recall that the index of a zero
s of f is de…ned as the sign of the determinant j@f(s)j. By the Poincaré-Hopf Theorem
and the continuity of the determinant
X
s2E(g)
sgnj@f(s)j = 1: (2.20)
It is easily seen that the index of a pure equilibrium is +1. Hence, if there are l pure
equilibria, there must be at least l ¡ 1 equilibria with index ¡1, and these must be
mixed. This latter result was also established in Gul et al. (1993). In this paper, the
authors construct a map g from the space of mixed strategies S into itself such that s
is a …xed point of g if and only if s is a Nash equilibrium. They de…ne an equilibrium
s to be regular if it is quasi-strict and if det(I ¡ g0(s)) 6= 0. Using the result that the
sum of the Lefschetz indices of the …xed points of a Lefschetz function is +1 and the
observation that a pure equilibrium has index +1, they obtain their result that a regular
game that has k pure equilibria must have at least k ¡ 1 mixed ones. The authors also
show that almost all games have only regular equilibria.
Recall that already Nash (1951) worked with a function f of which the …xed points
correspond with the equilibria of the game. (See also the remark immediately below
Theorem 1.) Nash’s function is, however, di¤erent from that of Gul et al. (1994), and
di¤erent from the function that we worked with in (2.15). This raises the question
of whether the choice of the function matters. In recent work, Govindan and Wilson
(2000) show that the anwer is no. These authors de…ne a Nash map as a continuous
function f : ¡ £ S ! S that has the property that for each …xed game g the induced
17
map fg : S ! S has as its …xed points the set of Nash equilibria of g. Given such a
Nash map, the index ind(C; f) of a component C of Nash equilibria of g is de…ned in
the usual way (see Dold (1972)). The main result of Govindan and Wilson (2000) states
that for any two Nash maps f , f 0 and any component C we have ind(C; f) = ind(C; f 0).
Furthermore, if the degree of a component, deg(C), is de…ned as the local degree of
the projection map from the graph E of the equilibrium correspondence to the space of
games (cf. Theorem 3), then ind(C; f) = deg(C) (see Govindan and Wilson (1997)).
2.4 Computation of equilibria: The 2-person case
The papers of Rosenmüller and Wilson mentioned in the previous theorem proved the
generic oddness of the number of equilibria of a strategic form game in a completely
di¤erent way than we did. These papers generalized the Lemke and Howson (1964)
algorithm for the computation of equilibria in bimatrix games to n-person games. Lemke
and Howson had already established the generic oddness of the number of equilibria for
bimatrix games and the only di¤erence between the 2-person case and the n-person case
is that in the latter the pivotal steps involve nonlinear computations rather than the
linear ones in the 2-person case. In this subsection we restrict ourselves to 2-person
games and brie‡y outline the Lemke/Howson algorithm, thereby establishing another
proof for Theorem 5 in the 2-person case. The discussion will be based upon Shapley
(1974).
Let g = hA; ui be a 2-person game. The nondegeneracy condition that we will use to
guarantee that the game is regular is
jC(s)j ¸ jB(s)j for all s 2 S (2.21)
This condition is clearly satis…ed for almost all bimatrix games and indeed ensures that
all equilibria are regular. We write L(si) for the set of “labels” associated with si 2 Si
L(si) = AinCi(si) [ Bj(si): (2.22)
If mi = jAij, then, by (2.21), the number of labels if si is at most mi. We will be
interested in the set Ni of those si that have exactly mi labels. This set is …nite: the
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regularity condition (2.21) guarantees that for each set L ½ A1 [ A2 with jLj = mi
there is at most one si 2 Si such that L(si) = L. Hence, the labelling identi…es the
strategy, so that the word label is appropriate. If si 2 NinAi, then for each ai 2 L(si)
there exists (because of (2.21)) a unique ray in Si emanating at si of points s0i with
L(s0i) = L(si)nfaig, and moving in the direction of this ray we …nd a new point s00i 2 Ni
after a …nite distance. A similar remark applies to si 2 Ni\Ai, except that in that case
we cannot eliminate the label corresponding to Bj(si). Consequently, we can construct
a graph Ti with node set Ni that has mi edges (of points s0i with jL(s0i)j = mi ¡ 1)
originating from each node in NinAi and that has mi ¡ 1 edges originating from each
node in Ni \ Ai. We say that two nodes are adjacent if they are connected by an edge,
hence, if they di¤er by one label.
Now consider the “product graph” T in the product set S: the set of nodes isN = N1£N2
and two nodes s; s0 are adjacent if for some i si = s0i while for j 6= i we have that sj
and s0j are adjacent in Nj. For s 2 S, write L(s) = L(s1) [ L(s2). Obviously, we have
that L(s) = A1 [ A2 if and only if s is a Nash equilibrium of g. Hence, equilibria
correspond to fully labelled strategy vectors and the set of such vectors will be denoted
by E. The regularity assumption (2.21) implies that E ½ N , hence, E is a …nite set.
For a 2 A1 [ A2 write Na for the set of s 2 N that miss at most the label a. The
observations made above imply the following fundamental lemma:
Lemma 1:
(i) If s 2 E; si = a, then s is adjacent to no node in N a
(ii) If s 2 E; si 6= a, then s is adjacent to exactly one node in Na
(iii) If s 2 NanE; si = a, then s is adjacent to exactly one node in Na
(iv) If s 2 NanE; si 6= a, then s is adjacent to exactly two nodes in Na
Proof :
(i) In this case s is a pure and strict equilibrium, hence, any move away from s
eliminates labels other than a.
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(ii) If s is a pure equilibrium, then the only move that eliminates only the label a is
to increase the probability of a in Ti. If si is mixed, then (2.21) implies that sj is
mixed as well. We either have si(a) = 0 or a 2 Bi(sj). In the …rst case the only
move that eliminates only label a is one in Ti (increase the probability of a), in
the second case it is the unique move in Tj away from the region where a is a best
response.
(iii) The only possibility that this case allows is s = (a; b) with b being the unique
best response to a. Hence, if a0 is the unique best response against b, the a0 is the
unique action that is labelled twice. The only possible move to an adjacent point
in N a is to increase the probability of a0 in Ti.
(iv) Let b be the unique action that is labelled by both s1 and s2, hence fbg = L(s1)\
L(s2). Note that si is mixed. If sj is mixed as well, then we can either drop b from
L(s1) in Ti or drop b from L(s2) in Tj. This yields two di¤erent possibilities and
these are the only ones. If sj is pure, then b 2 Ai and the same argument applies.
¤
The lemma now implies that an equilibrium can be found by tracing a path of almost
completely labelled strategy vectors in Na, i.e. vectors that miss at most a. Start at the
pure strategy pair (a; b) where b is the best response to a. If a is also the best response
to b, we are done. If not, then we are in case (iii) of the lemma and we can follow a
unique edge in Na starting at (a; b). The next node s we encounter is one satisfying
either condition (ii) of the lemma (and then we are done) or condition (iv). In the latter
case, there are two edges of Na at s. We came in via one route, hence there is only one
way to continue. Proceeding in similar fashion, we encounter distinct nodes of type (iv)
until we …nally hit upon a node of type (ii). The latter must eventually happen since
Na has …nitely many nodes.
The lemma also implies that the number of equilibria is odd. Consider an equilibrium s0
di¤erent from the one found by the above construction. Condition (ii) from the lemma
guarantees that this equilibrium is connected to exactly one node in N a as in condition
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(iv) of the lemma. We can now repeat the above constructive process until we end
up at yet another equilibrium s00. Hence, all equilibria, except the distinguished one
constructed above, appear in pairs: The total number of equilibria is odd.
Note that the algorithm described in this subsection o¤ers no guarantee to …nd more
than one equilibrium, let alone to …nd all equilibria. Shapley (1981) discusses a way
of transforming the paths so as to get access to some of the previously inaccessible
equilibria.
2.5 Puri…cation of mixed strategy equilibria
In Section 2.1 we noted that mixed strategies can be interpreted both as acts of deliberate
randomization as well as representations of players’ beliefs. The former interpretation
seems intuitively somewhat problematic; it may be hard to accept the idea of making
an important decision on the basis of a toss of a coin. Mixed strategy equilibria also
seem unstable: To optimize his payo¤ a player does not need to randomize; any pure
strategy in the support is equally as good as the equilibrium strategy itself. The only
reason a player randomizes is to keep the other players in equilibrium, but why would a
player want to do this? Hence, equilibria in mixed strategies seem di¢cult to interpret
(Aumann and Maschler (1972), Rubinstein (1991)).
Harsanyi (1973a) was the …rst to discuss the more convincing alternative interpretation
of a mixed strategy of player i as a representation of the ignorance of the opponents as
to what player i is actually going to do. Even though player i may follow a deterministic
rule, the opponents may not be able to predict i’s actions exactly, since i’s decision might
depend on information that the opponents can only assess probabilistically. Harsanyi
argues that each player always has a tiny bit of private information about his own payo¤s
and he modi…es the game accordingly. Such a slightly perturbed game admits equilibria
in pure strategies and the (regular) mixed equilibria of the original unperturbed game
may be interpreted as the limiting beliefs associated with these pure equilibria of the
perturbed games. In this subsection we give Harsanyi’s construction and state and
illustrate his main result.
Let g = hA; ui be an I-person normal form game and, for each i 2 I, let Xi be a random
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vector taking values in RA. Let X = (Xi)i2I and assume that di¤erent components of
X are stochastically independent. Let Fi be the distribution function of Xi and assume
that Fi admits a continuously di¤erentiable density fi that is strictly positive on some
ball £i around zero in RA (and 0 outside that ball). For " > 0, write g"(X) for the game
described by the following rules:
(i) nature draws x from X
(ii) each player i is informed about his component xi
(iii) simultaneously and independently each player i selects an action ai 2 Ai
(iv) each player i receives the payo¤ ui(a) + "xi(a), where a is the action combination
resulting from (iii).
Note that, if " is small, a player’s payo¤ is close to the payo¤ from g with probability
approximately 1. What a player will do in g"(X) depends on his observation and on his
beliefs about what the opponents will do. Note that these beliefs are independent of his
observation and that, no matter what the beliefs might be, the player will be indi¤erent
between two pure actions with probability zero. Hence, we may assume that each player
i restricts himself to a pure strategy in g"(X), i.e. to a map ¾i : £i ! Ai. (If a player is
indi¤erent, he himself does not care what he does and his opponents do not care since
they attach probability zero to this event.) Given a strategy vector ¾" in g"(X) and
ai 2 Ai write £aii (¾") for the set of observations where ¾"i prescribes to play ai. If a









The mixed strategy vector s" 2 S determined by (2.23) will be called the vector of
beliefs associated with the strategy vector ¾". Note that all opponents j of i have the
same beliefs about player i since they base themselves on the same information. The
strategy combination ¾" is an equilibrium of g"(X) if, for each player i; it assigns an
optimal action at each observation, hence
if xi 2 £aii (¾"); then ai 2 argmax[ui(s"nai) + "xi(s"nai)]: (2.24)
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We can now state Harsanyi’s theorem
Theorem 6 (Harsanyi (1973b)). Let g be a regular normal form game and let the
equilibria be s1; :::; sK. Then, for su¢ciently small ", the game g"(X) has exactly K
equilibrium belief vectors, say s1("):::; sK("); and these are such that lim
"!0
sk(") = sk for
all k. Furthermore, the equilibrium ¾k(") underlying the belief vector sk(") can be taken
to be pure.
We will illustrate this theorem by means of a simple example, the game from Fig. 1.
(The “t” stands for “tough”, the “w” for “weak”, the game is a variation of the battle
of the sexes). For analytical simplicity, we will perturb only one payo¤ for each player,
as indicated in the diagram
w2 t2
t1 1; u2 + "x2 0; 0
w1 u1 + "x1; u2 + "x2 u1 + "x1; 1
Figure 1: A perturbed game g"(x1; x2) (0 < u1; u2 < 1)
The unperturbed game g (" = 0 in Figure 1) has 3 equilibria, (t1; w2); (w1; t2) and a
mixed equilibrium in which each player i chooses ti with probability si = 1¡uj (i 6= j).
The pure equilibria are strict, hence, it is easily seen that they can be approximated by
equilibrium beliefs of the perturbed games in which the players have private information:
If " is small, then (ti; wj) is a strict equilibrium of g"(x1; x2) for a set of (x1; x2)-values
with large probability. Let us show how the mixed equilibrium of g can be approximated.
If player i assigns probability s"j to j playing tj , then he prefers to play ti if and only if
1¡ s"j > ui + "xi: (2.25)
Writing Fi for the distribution of Xi we have that the probability that j assigns to the
event (2.25) is Fi((s"j ¡ ui)="), hence, to have an equilibrium of the perturbed game we
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must have
s"i = Fi((1¡ s"j ¡ ui)=") i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j: (2.26)
Writing Gi for the inverse of Fi, we obtain the equivalent conditions
1¡ s"j ¡ ui ¡ "Gi(s"i ) = 0 i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j: (2.27)
For " = 0, the system of equations has the regular, completely mixed equilibrium of g
as a solution, hence, the implicit function theorem implies that, for " su¢ciently small,
there is exactly one solution (s"1; s
"
2) of (2.27) with s
"
i ! 1¡ uj as " ! 0. These beliefs
are the ones mentioned in Theorem 6. A corresponding pure equilibrium strategy for
each player i is: play wi if xi  (1¡ s"j ¡ ui)=" and play bi otherwise.
For more results on puri…cation of mixed strategy equilibria, we refer to Aumann et al.
(1983), Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982). These papers
consider the case where the private signals that players receive do not in‡uence the
payo¤s and they address the question of how much randomness there should be in the
environment in order to enable puri…cation. In Section 5 we will show that completely
di¤erent results are obtained if players make common noisy observations on the entire
game: In this case even some strict equilibria cannot be approximated.
3 Backward induction equilibria in extensive form
games
Selten (1965) pointed out that, in extensive form games, not every Nash equilibrium
can be considered self-enforcing. Selten’s basic example is similar to the game g from
Figure 2, which has (l1; l2) and (r1; r2) as its two pure Nash equilibria. The equilibrium
(l1; l2) is not self-enforcing. Since the game is noncooperative, player 2 has no ability to
commit himself to l2. If he is actually called upon to move, player 2 strictly prefers to
play r2, hence, being rational, he will indeed play r2 in that case. Player 1 can foresee
that player 2 will deviate to r2 if he himself deviates to r1, hence, it is in the interest





























Figure 2: A Nash equilibrium that is not self-enforcing
Being a Nash equilibrium, (l1; l2) has the property that no player has an incentive to
deviate from it if he expects the opponent to stick to this strategy pair. The example,
however, shows that player 1’s expectation that player 2 will abide by an agreement on
(l1; l2) is nonsensical. For a self-enforcing agreement we should not only require that no
player can pro…tably deviate if nobody else deviates, we should also require that the
expectation that nobody deviates be rational. In this section we discuss several solution
concepts, re…nements of Nash equilibrium, that have been proposed as formalizations
of this requirement. In particular, attention is focussed on sequential equilibria (Kreps
and Wilson (1982a)) and on perfect equilibria (Selten (1975)). Along the way we will
also discuss Myerson’s (1978) notion of proper equilibrium. First, however, we introduce
some basic concepts and notation related to extensive form games.
3.1 Extensive form and related normal forms
Throughout, attention will be con…ned to …nite extensive form games with perfect recall.
Such a game g is given by
(i) a collection I of players,
(ii) a game tree K specifying the physical order of play,
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(iii) for each player i a collection Hi of information sets specifying the information a
player has when he has to move. Hence Hi is a partition of the set of decision
points of player i in the game and if two nodes x and y are in the same element h
of the partition Hi, then i cannot distinguish between x and y,
(iv) for each information set h, a speci…cation of the set of choices Ch that are feasible
at that set,
(v) a speci…cation of the probabilities associated with chance moves, and
(vi) for each end point z of the tree and each player i a payo¤ ui(z) that player i
receives when z is reached.
For formal de…nitions, we refer to Selten (1975), Kreps and Wilson (1982) or Hart
(1992). For an extensive form game g we write g = (¡; u) where ¡ speci…es the structural
characteristics of the game and u gives the payo¤s. ¡ is called a game form. The set of
all games with game form ¡ can be identi…ed with an jI j £ jZj Euclidean space, where
I is the player set and Z the set of end points. The assumption of perfect recall, saying
that no player ever forgets what he has known or what he has done, implies that each
Hi is a partially ordered set.
A local strategy sih of player i at h 2 Hi is a probability distribution on the set Ch of
choices at this information set h. It is interpreted as a plan for what i will do at h or
as the beliefs of the opponents of what i will do at that information set. Note that the
latter interpretation assumes that di¤erent players hold the same beliefs about what
i will do at h and that these beliefs do not change throughout the game. A behavior
strategy si of player i assigns a local strategy sih to each h 2 Hi. We write Sih for the
set of local strategies at h and Si for the set of all behavior strategies of player i. A
behavior strategy si is called pure if it associates a pure action at each h 2 Hi and the
set of all these strategies is denoted Ai.
A behavior strategy combination s = (s1; ::: sI) speci…es a behavior strategy for each
player i. The probability distribution ps that s induces on Z is called the outcome of
s. Two strategies s0i and s
00




i for each strategy combination s, i.e. if they induce the same outcomes against
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s(z)ui(z). If x is a node of the game tree, then psx denotes the probability
distribution that results on Z when the game is started at x with strategies s and uix(s)
denotes the associated expectation of ui. If every information set h of g that contains
a node y after x actually has all its nodes after x, then that part of the tree of g that
comes after x is a game of its own. It is called the subgame of g starting at x.
The normal form associated with g is the normal form game hA; ui which has the same
player set, the same sets of pure strategies and the same payo¤ functions as g has. A
mixed strategy from the normal form induces a behavioral strategy in the extensive form
and Kuhn’s (1953) theorem for games with perfect recall guarantees that, conversely, for
every mixed strategy, there exists a behavior strategy that is realization equivalent to it.
(See Hart (1992) for more details.) Note that the normal form frequently contains many
realization equivalent pure strategies for each player: If the information set h 2 Hi is
excluded by player i’s own strategy, then it is “irrelevant” what the strategy prescribes
at h. The game that results from the normal form if we replace each equivalence class (of
realization equivalent) pure strategies by a representative from that class, will be called
the semi-reduced normal form. Working with the semi-reduced normal form implies that
we do not specify playerj’s beliefs about what i will do at an information set h 2 Hi
that is excluded by i’s own strategy.
The agent normal form associated with g is the normal form game hC; ui that has a
player ih associated with every information set h of each player i in g. This player
ih has the set Ch of feasible actions as his pure strategy set and his payo¤ function is
the payo¤ of the player i to whom he belongs. Hence, if cih 2 Ch for each h 2 [iHi,
then s = (cih)ih is a (pure) strategy combination in g and we de…ne uih(s) = ui(s) for
h 2 Hi. The agent normal form was …rst introduced in Selten (1975). It provides a
local perspective, it decentralizes the strategy decision of player i into a number of local
decisions. When planning his decision for h, the player does not necessarily assume that
he is in full control of the decision at an information set h0 2 Hi that comes after h,
but he is sure that the player/agent making the decision at that stage has the same
objectives as he has. Hence, a player is replaced by a team of identically motivated
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agents.
Note that a pure strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form. Because of perfect recall, a
similar remark applies to equilibria that involve randomization, provided that we iden-
tify strategies that are realization equivalent. Hence, we may de…ne a Nash equilibrium
of the extensive form as a Nash equilibrium of the associated (agent) normal form and
obtain (2.12) as the de…ning equations for such an equilibrium. It follows from Theorem
1 that each extensive form game has at least one Nash equilibrium. Theorems 2 and
3 give information about the structure of the set of Nash equilibria of extensive form
games. Kreps and Wilson proved a partial generalization of Theorem 4:
Theorem 7 (Kreps and Wilson (1982a)). Let ¡ be any game form. Then, for almost
all u, the extensive form game h¡; ui has …nitely many Nash equilibrium outcomes (i.e.
the set fps(u) : s is a Nash equilibrium of h¡; uig is …nite) and these outcomes depend
continuously on u.
Note that in this theorem, …niteness cannot be strengthened to oddness: Any extensive
form game with the same structure as in Figure 2 and with payo¤s close to those in
Figure 2 has l1 and (r1; r2) as Nash equilibrium outcomes. Hence, Theorem 5 does
not hold for extensive form games. Little is known about whether Theorem 6 can be
extended to classes of extensive form games. However, see Fudenberg et al. (1988) for
results concerning various forms of payo¤ uncertainty in extensive form games.
Before moving on to discuss some re…nements in the next subsections, we brie‡y mention
some coarsenings of the Nash concept that have been proposed for extensive form games.
Pearce (1984), Battigalli (1997) and Börgers (1991) propose concepts of extensive form
rationalizability. Some of these also aim to capture some aspects of forward induction
(see Section 4). Fudenberg and Levine (1993ab) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994)
introduce, respectively, the concepts of “self-con…rming equilibria” and of “rationaliz-
able conjectural equilibria” that impose restrictions that are in between those of Nash
equilibrium and rationalizability. These concepts require players to hold identical and
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correct beliefs about actions taken at information sets that are on the equilibrium path,
but allow players to have di¤erent beliefs about opponents’ play at information sets that
are not reached. Hence, in such an equilibrium, if players only observe outcomes, no
player will observe play that contradicts his predictions.
3.2 Subgame perfect equilibria
The Nash equilibrium condition (2.12) requires that each player’s strategy be optimal
from the ex ante point of view. Ex ante optimality implies that the strategy is also
ex post optimal at each information set that is reached with positive probability in
equilibrium, but, as the game of Figure 2 illustrates, such ex post optimality need not
hold at the unreached information sets. The example suggests imposing ex post opti-
mality as a necessary requirement for self-enforcingness but, of course, this requirement
is meaningful only when conditional expected payo¤s are well-de…ned, i.e. when the
information set is a singleton. In particular, the suggestion is feasible for games with
perfect information, i.e. games in which all information sets are singletons, and in this
case one may require as a condition for s¤ to be self-enforcing that it satis…es
uih(s
¤) ¸ uih(s¤nsi) for all i; all si 2 Si all h 2 Hi: (3.1)
Condition (3.1) states that at no decision point h can a player gain by deviating from s¤
if after h no other player deviates from s¤. Obviously, equilibria satisfying (3.1) can be
found by rolling back the game tree in a dynamic programming fashion, a procedure al-
ready employed in Zermelo (1912). It is, however, also worthwhile to remark that already
in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) it was argued that this backward induction
procedure was not necessarily justi…ed as it incorporates a very strong assumption of
“persistent” rationality. Recently, Hart (1999) has shown that the procedure may be
justi…ed in an evolutionary setting. Adopting Zermelo’s procedure one sees that, for
perfect information games, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium satisfying (3.1)
and that, for generic perfect information games, (3.1) selects exactly one equilibrium.
Furthermore, in the latter case, the outcome of this equilibrium is the unique outcome
that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the normal form
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of the game. (Each elimination order leaves at least this outcome and there exists a
sequence of eliminations that leaves nothing but this outcome, cf. Moulin (1979).)
Selten (1978) was the …rst paper to show that the solution determined by (3.1) may be
hard to accept as a guide to practical behavior. (Of course, it was already known for a
long time that in some games, such as chess, playing as (3.1) dictates may be infeasible
since the solution s¤ cannot be computed.) Selten considered the …nite repetition of
the game from Figure 2, with one player 2 playing the game against a sequence of
di¤erent players in each round and with players always being perfectly informed about
the outcomes in previous rounds. In the story that Selten associates with this game,
player 2 is the owner of a chain store who is threatened by entry in each of …nitely many
towns. When entry takes place (r1 is chosen), the chain store owner either acquiesces
(chooses r2) or …ghts entry (chooses l2). The backward induction solution has players
play (r1; r2) in each round, but intuitively, we expect player 2 to behave aggressively
(choose l2) at the beginning of the game with the aim of inducing later entrants to stay
out. The chain store paradox is the paradox that even people who accept the logical
validity of the backward induction reasoning somehow remain unconvinced by it and
do not act in the manner that it prescribes, but rather act according to the intuitive
solution. Hence, there is an inconsistency between plausible human behavior and game-
theoretic reasoning. Selten’s conclusion from the paradox is that a theory of perfect
rationality may be of limited relevance for actual human behavior and he proposes a
theory of limited rationality to resolve the paradox. Other researchers have argued
that the paradox may be caused more by the inadequacy of the model than by the
solution concept that is applied to it. Our intuition for the chain store game may derive
from a richer game in which the deterrence equilibrium indeed is a rational solution.
Such richer models have been constructed in Kreps and Wilson (1982b), Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) and Aumann (1992). These papers change the game by allowing a tiny
probability that player 2 may actually …nd it optimal to …ght entry, which has the
consequence that, when the game still lasts for a long time, player 2 will always play as
if it is optimal to …ght entry which forces player 1 to stay out.
The cause of the chain store paradox is the assumption of persistent rationality that
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underlies (3.1), i.e. players are forced to believe that even at information sets h that
can be reached only by many deviations from s¤, behavior will be in accordance with
s¤. This assumption that forces a player to believe that an opponent is rational even
after he has seen the opponent make irrational moves has been extensively discussed
and criticized in the literature, with many contributions being critical (see, for exam-
ple, Basu (1988, 1990), Ben Porath (1993), Binmore (1987), Reny (1992ab, 1993) and
Rosenthal (1981)). Binmore argues that human rationality may di¤er in systematic
ways from the perfect rationality that game theory assumes, and he urges theorists to
build richer models that incorporate explicit human thinking processes and that take
these systematic deviations into account. Reny argues that (3.1) assumes that there
is common knowledge of rationality throughout the game, but that this assumption is
self-contradicting: Once a player has “shown” that he is irrational (for example, by
playing a strictly dominated move), rationality can no longer be common knowledge
and solution concepts that build on this assumption are no longer appropriate. Au-
mann and Brandenburger (1995) however argue that Nash equilibrium does not build
on this common knowledge assumption. Reny (1993), on the other hand, concludes
from the above that a theory of rational behavior cannot be developed in a context that
does not allow for irrational behavior, a conclusion similar to the one also reached in
Selten (1975) and Aumann (1987b). Aumann (1995), however, disagrees with the view
that the assumption of common knowledge of rationality is impossible to maintain in
extensive form games with perfect information. As he writes “The aim of this paper is
to present a coherent formulation and proof of the principle that in PI games, common
knowledge of rationality implies backward induction” (p. 7) (see also Aumann (1998)
for an application to Rosenthal’s centipede game; the references in that paper provide
further information, also on other points of view).
We now leave this discussion on backward induction in games with perfect information
and move on to discuss more general games. Selten (1965) notes that the argument
leading to (3.1) can be extended beyond the class of games with perfect information. If
the game g admits a subgame °, then the expected payo¤s of s¤ in ° depend only on what
s¤ prescribes in °. Denote this restriction of s¤ to ° by s¤°. Once the subgame ° is reached,
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all other parts of the game have become strategically irrelevant, hence, Selten argues
that, for s¤ to be self-enforcing, it is necessary that s¤° be self-enforcing for every subgame
°. Selten de…ned a subgame perfect equilibrium as an equilibrium s¤ of g that induces
a Nash equilibrium s¤° in each subgame ° of g and he proposed subgame perfection as
a necessary requirement for self-enforcingness. Since every equilibrium of a subgame of
a …nite game can be “extended” to an equilibrium of the overall game, it follows that
every …nite extensive form game has at least one subgame perfect equilibrium.
Existence is, however, not as easily established for games in which the strategy spaces are
continuous. In that case, not every subgame equilibrium is part of an overall equilibrium:
Players moving later in the game may be forced to break ties in a certain way, in order to
guarantee that players who moved earlier indeed played optimally. (As a simple example,
let player 1 …rst choose x 2 [0; 1] and let then player 2, knowing x, choose y 2 [0; 1].
Payo¤s are give by u1(x; y) = xy and u2(x; y) = (1¡x)y. In the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium both players choose 1 even though player 2 is completely indi¤erent when
player 1 chooses x = 1:) Indeed, well-behaved continuous extensive form games need not
have a subgame perfect equilibrium, as Harris et al. (1995) have shown. However, these
authors also show that, for games with almost perfect information (“stage” games),
existence can be restored if players can observe a common random signal before each
new stage of the game which allows them to correlate their actions. For the special case
where information is perfect, i.e. information sets are singletons, Harris (1985) shows
that a subgame perfect equilibrium does exist even when correlation is not possible (see
also Hellwig et al. (1990)).
Other chapters of this Handbook contain ample illustrations of the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium, hence, we will not give further examples. It su¢ces to remark here
that subgame perfection is not su¢cient for self-enforcingness, as is illustrated by the
















t 3; 1 1; 0
b 0; 1 0; x
l2 r2
l1 2; 2 2; 2
r1t 3; 1 1; 0
r1b 0; 1 0; x
Figure 3: Not all subgame perfect equilibria are self-enforcing
The left-hand side of Figure 3 illustrates a game where player 1 …rst chooses whether or
not to play a 2£ 2 game. If player 1 chooses r1, both players are informed that r1 has
been chosen and that they have to play the 2£ 2 game. This 2£ 2 game is a subgame
of the overall game and it has (t; l2) as its unique equilibrium. Consequently, (r1t; l2) is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The game on the right is the (semi-reduced)
normal form of the game on the left. The only di¤erence between the games is that,
in the normal form, player 1 chooses simultaneously between l1; r1t and r1b and that
player 2 does not get to hear that player 1 has not chosen l1. However, these changes
appear inessential since player 2 is indi¤erent between l2 and r2 when player 1 chooses
l1. Hence, it would appear that an equilibrium is self-enforcing in one game only if it
is self-enforcing in the other. However, the sets of subgame perfect equilibria of these
games di¤er. The game on the right does not admit any proper subgames so that the
Nash equilibrium (l1; r2) is trivially subgame perfect.
3.3 Perfect equilibria
We have seen that Nash equilibria may prescribe irrational, non-maximizing behavior at
unreached information sets. Selten (1975) proposes to eliminate such non-self-enforcing
equilibria by eliminating the possibility of unreached information sets. He proposes to
look at complete rationality as a limiting case of incomplete rationality, i.e. to assume
that players make mistakes with small vanishing probability and to restrict attention to
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the limits of the corresponding equilibria. Such equilibria are called (trembling hand)
perfect equilibria.
Formally, for an extensive form game g, Selten (1975) assumes that at each information
set h 2 Hi player i will, with a small probability "h > 0; su¤er from “momentary
insanity” and make a mistake. Note that "h is assumed not to depend on the intended
action at h. If such a mistake occurs, player i’s behavior is assumed to be governed by
some unspeci…ed psychological mechanism which results in each choice c at h occurring
with a strictly positive probability ¾h(c). Selten assumes each of these probabilities
"h and ¾h(c) (h 2 Hi; c 2 Ch) to be independent of each other and also to be
independent of the corresponding probabilities of the other players. As a consequence of
these assumptions, if a player i intends to play the behavior strategy si, he will actually
play the behaviour strategy s";¾i given by
s";¾i (c) = (1¡ "h)sih(c) + "h¾h(c) (c 2 Ch; h 2 Hi): (3.2)
Obviously, given these mistakes all information sets are reached with positive probability.
Furthermore, if players intend to play ¹s, then, given the mistake technology speci…ed by
("; ¾), each player i will at each information set h intend to choose a local strategy sih
that satis…es
ui(¹s
";¾nsih) ¸ ui(¹s";¾ns0ih) all s0ih 2 Sih: (3.3)
If (3.3) is satis…ed by sih = ¹sih at each h 2 [iHi (i.e. if the intended action optimizes
the payo¤ taking the constraints into account), then ¹s is said to be an equilibrium of the
perturbed game g";¾. Hence, (3.3) incorporates the assumption of persistent rationality.
Players try to maximize whenever they have to move, but each time they fall short of
the ideal. Note that the de…nitions have been chosen to guarantee that ¹s is an equilib-
rium of g";¾ if and only if ¹s is an equilibrium of the corresponding perturbation of the
agent normal form of g. A straightforward application of Kakutani’s …xed point theorem
yields that each perturbed game has at least one equilibrium. Selten (1975) then de…nes
¹s to be a perfect equilibrium of g if there exist sequences "k; ¾k of mistake probabilities
("k > 0; "k ! 0) and mistake vectors ¾kih(c) > 0 and an associated sequence sk with sk
being an equilibrium of the perturbed game g"
k;¾k such that sk ! ¹s as k ! 1. Since
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the set of strategy vectors is compact, it follows that each game has at least one perfect
equilibrium. It may also be veri…ed that ¹s is a perfect equilibrium of g if and only if
there exists a sequence sk of completely mixed behavior strategies (skih(c) > 0 for all
i; h; c; k) that converges to ¹s as k ! 1, such that ¹sih is a local best reply against any





knsih) (all i; h; k): (3.4)
Note that for ¹s to be perfect, it is su¢cient that ¹s can be rationalized by some sequence
of vanishing trembles, it is not necessary that ¹s be robust against all possible trembles.
In the next section we will discuss concepts that insist on such stronger stability. We
will also encounter concepts that require robustness with respect to speci…c sequences
of trembles. For example, Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) concept of uniformly perfect
equilibria is based on the assumption that all mistakes are equally likely. In contrast,
Myerson’s (1978) properness concept builds on the assumption that mistakes that are
more costly are much less likely.
It is easily veri…ed that each perfect equilibrium is subgame perfect. The converse is not
true: In the game on the right of Figure 3 with x  1, player 2 strictly prefers to play
l2 if player 1 chooses r1t and r1b by mistake, hence, only (r1t; l2) is perfect. However,
since there are no subgames, (l1; r2) is subgame perfect.
By de…nition, the perfect equilibria of the extensive form game g are the perfect equi-
libria of the agent normal form of g. However, they need not coincide with the perfect
equilibria of the associated normal form. Applying the above de…nitions to the normal
form shows that ¹s is a perfect equilibrium of a normal form game g = hA; ui if there ex-
ists a sequence of completely mixed strategy pro…les sk with sk ! ¹s such that ¹s 2 B(sk)





knsi) (all i; k): (3.5)
Hence, we claim that the global conditions (3.5) may determine a di¤erent set of solutions
than the local conditions (3.4). As a …rst example, consider the game from Figure 4. In
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the extensive form, player 1 is justi…ed to choose L if he expects himself, at his second
decision node, to make mistakes with a larger probability than player 2 does. Hence,
the outcome (1; 2) is perfect in the extensive form. In the normal form, however, Rl1 is
a strategy that guarantees player 1 the payo¤ 1. This strategy dominates all others, so
that perfectness forces player 1 to play it, hence, only the outcome (1; 1) is perfect in
the normal form. Motivated by the consideration that a player may be more concerned
with mistakes of others than with his own, Van Damme (1984) introduces the concept
of a quasi-perfect equilibrium. Here each player follows a strategy that at each node
speci…es an action that is optimal against mistakes of other players, keeping the player’s
own strategy …xed throughout the game. Mertens (1992) has argued that this concept
of “quasi-perfect equilibria” is to be preferred above “extensive form perfect equilibria”.


























l2 r2 l1 r1
(1; 2) (0; 0) (1; 1) (0; 0)
l2 r2
L 1; 2 0; 0
Rl1 1; 1 1; 1
Rr1 0; 0 0; 0
Figure 4: A perfect equilibrium of the extensive form
need not be perfect in the normal form
Conversely, we have that a perfect equilibrium of the normal form need not even be
subgame perfect in the extensive form. The game from Figure 3 with x > 1 provides
an example. Only the outcome (3,1) is subgame perfect in the extensive form. In the
normal form, player 2 is justi…ed in playing r2 if he expects that player 1 is (much)
more likely to make the mistake r1b than to make the mistake r1t. Hence, (l1; r2) is a
perfect equilibrium in the normal form. Note that in both examples there is at least one
equilibrium that is perfect in both the extensive and the normal form. Mertens (1992)
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discusses an example in which the sets of perfect equilibria of these game forms are dis-
joint: the normal form game has a dominant strategy equilibrium, but this equilibrium
is not perfect in the extensive form of the game.
It follows from (3.5) that a perfect equilibrium strategy of a normal form game cannot
be weakly dominated. (Strategy s0i is said to be weakly dominated by s
00
i if ui(sns00i ) ¸
ui(sns0i) for all s and ui(sns00i ) > ui(sns0i) for some s:) Equilibria in undominated strate-
gies are not necessarily perfect, but an application of the separating hyperplane theorem
shows that the two concepts coincide in the 2-person case (Van Damme (1983)). (In
the general case a strategy si is not weakly dominated if and only if it is a best reply
against a completely mixed correlated strategy of the opponents.)
Before summarizing the discussion from this section in a theorem we note that games
in which the strategy spaces are continua and payo¤s are continuous need not have
equilibria in undominated strategies. Consider the 2-player game in which each player i
chooses xi from [0; 12 ] and in which ui(x) = xi if xi  xj=2 and ui(x) = xj(1¡xi)=2¡xj
otherwise. Then the unique equilibrium is x = 0, but this is in dominated strategies.
We refer to Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) for de…nitions of perfectness concepts for
continuous games.
Theorem 8 (Selten (1975)). Every game has at least one perfect equilibrium. Every
extensive form perfect equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence, a Nash equi-
librium. An equilibrium of an extensive form game is perfect if and only if it is perfect in
the associated agent normal form. A perfect equilibrium of the normal form need not be
perfect in the extensive form and also the converse need not be true. Every perfect equi-
librium of a strategic form game is in undominated strategies and, in 2-person normal
form games, every undominated equilibrium is perfect.
3.4 Sequential equilibria
Kreps and Wilson (1982a) propose to eliminate irrational behavior at unreached infor-
mation sets in a somewhat di¤erent way than Selten does. They propose to extend the
applicability of (3.1) by explicitly specifying beliefs (i.e. conditional probabilities) at
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each information set so that posterior expected payo¤s can always be computed. Hence,
whenever a player reaches an information set, he should, in conformity with Bayesian
decision theory, be able to produce a probability distribution on the nodes in that set
that represents his uncertainty. Of course, players’ beliefs should be consistent with
the strategies actually played (i.e. beliefs should be computed from Bayes’ rule when-
ever possible) and they should respect the structure of the game (i.e. if a player has
essentially the same information at h as at h0, his beliefs at these sets should coincide).
Kreps and Wilson ensure that these two conditions are satis…ed by deriving the beliefs
from a sequence of completely mixed strategies that converges to the strategy pro…le in
question.
Formally, a system of beliefs ¹ is de…ned as a map that assigns to each information set
h 2 [iHi a probability distribution ¹h on the nodes in that set. The interpretation is
that, when h 2 Hi is reached, player i assigns a probability ¹h(x) to each node x in h.
The system of beliefs ¹ is said to be consistent with the strategy pro…le s if there exists
a sequence sk of completely mixed behavior strategies (skih(c) > 0 for all i; h; k; c) with





(xjh) for all h; x (3.6)
where ps
k
(xjh) denotes the (well-de…ned) conditional probability that x is reached given
that h is reached and sk is played. Write u¹ih(s) for player i’s expected payo¤ at h
associated with s and ¹, hence u¹ih(s) = §x2h¹h(x)uix(s), where uix is as de…ned in
Section 3.1. The pro…le s is said to be sequentially rational given ¹ if
u¹ih(s) ¸ u¹ih(sns0i) all i; h; s0i: (3.7)
An assessment (s; ¹) is said to be a sequential equilibrium if ¹ is consistent with s and
if s is sequentially rational given ¹. Hence, the di¤erence between perfect equilibria and
sequential equilibria is that the former concept requires ex post optimality approaching
the limit, while the latter requires this only at the limit. Roughly speaking, perfectness
amounts to sequentiality plus admissibility (i.e. the prescribed actions are not locally
dominated). Hence, if s is perfect, then there exists some ¹ such that (s; ¹) is a sequen-
tial equilibrium, but the converse does not hold: In a normal form game every Nash
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equilibrium is sequential, but not every Nash equilibrium is perfect. The di¤erence be-
tween the concepts is only marginal: for almost all games the concepts yield the same
outcomes. The main innovation of the concept of sequential equilibrium is the explicit
incorporation of the system of beliefs sustaining the strategies as part of the de…nition
of equilibrium. In this, it provides a language for discussing the relative plausibility of
various systems of beliefs and the associated equilibria sustained by them. This language
has proved very e¤ective in the discussion of equilibrium re…nements in games with in-
complete information (see, for example, Kreps and Sobel (1994)). We summarize the
above remarks in the following theorem. (In it, we abuse the language somewhat: s 2 S
is said to be a sequential equilibrium if there exists some ¹ such that (s; ¹) is sequential.)
Theorem 9 (Kreps and Wilson (1982a), Blume and Zame (1994)). Every perfect equi-
librium is sequential and every sequential equilibrium is subgame perfect. For any game
structure ¡ we have that for almost all games h¡; ui with that structure the sets of perfect
and sequential equilibria coincide. For such generic payo¤s u, the set of perfect equilibria
depends continuously on u.
Let us note that, if the action spaces are continua, and payo¤s are continuous, a se-
quential equilibrium need not exist. A simple example is the following signalling game
(Van Damme (1987b)). Nature …rst selects the type t of player 1, t 2 f0; 2g with both
possibilities being equally likely. Next, player 1 chooses x 2 [0; 2] and thereafter player
2, knowing x but not knowing t, chooses y 2 [0; 2]. Payo¤s are u1(t; x; y) = (x¡t)(y¡ t)
and u2(t; x; y) = (1¡ x)y. If player 2 does not choose y = 2¡ t at x = 1, then type t of
player 1 does not have a best response. Hence, there is at least one type that does not
have a best response, and a sequential equilibrium does not exist.
In the literature one …nds a variety of solution concepts that are related to the sequential
equilibrium notion. In applications it might be di¢cult to construct an approximating
sequence as in (3.6), hence, one may want to work with a more liberal concept that
incorporates just the requirement that beliefs are consistent with s whenever possible,
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hence ¹h(x) = p
s(sjh) whenever ps(h) > 0. Combining this condition with the sequen-
tial rationality requirement (3.7) we obtain the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
which has frequently been applied in dynamic games with incomplete information. Some
authors have argued that in the context of an incomplete information game, one should
impose a support restriction on the beliefs: once a certain type of a player is assigned
probability zero, the probability of this type should remain at zero for the remainder
of the game. Obviously, this restriction comes in handy when doing backward induc-
tion. However, the restriction is not compelling and there may exist no Nash equilibria
satisfying it (see Madrigal et al. (1987), Noldeke and Van Damme (1990)). For further
discussions on variations of the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the reader is
referred to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
Since the sequential rationality requirement (3.7) has already been discussed extensively
in Section 3.2, there is no need to go into detail here. Rather let us focus on the con-
sistency requirement (3.6). When motivating this requirement, Kreps/Wilson refer to
the intuitive idea that when a player reaches an information set h with ps(h) = 0, he
reassesses the game, comes up with an alternative hypothesis s0 (with ps
0
(h) > 0) about
how the game is played and then constructs his beliefs at h from s0. A system of beliefs
is called structurally consistent if it can be constructed in this way. Kreps and Wilson
claimed that consistency, as in (3.6), implies structural consistency, but this claim was
shown to be incorrect in Kreps and Ramey (1987): There may not exist an equilibrium
that can be sustained by beliefs that are both consistent and structurally consistent.
At …rst sight this appears to be a serious blow to the concept of sequential equilibrium,
or at least to its motivation. However, the problem may be seen to lie in the idea of
reassessing the game, which is not intuitive at all. First of all, it goes counter to the idea
of rational players who can foresee the play in advance: They would have to reassess
at the start. Secondly, interpreting strategy vectors as beliefs about how the game will
be played implies there is no reassessment: All agents have the same beliefs about the
behavior of each agent. Thirdly, the combination of structural consistency with the
sequential rationality requirement (3.7) is problematic: If player i believes at h that s0 is
played, shouldn’t he then optimize against s0 rather then against s? Of course, rejecting
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structural consistency leaves us with the question of whether an alternative justi…cation
for (3.6) can be given. Kohlberg and Reny (1997) provide such a natural interpretation
of consistency by relying on the idea of consistent probability systems.
3.5 Proper equilibria
In Section 3.1 we have seen that perfectness in the normal form is not su¢cient to
guarantee (subgame) perfectness in the extensive form. This observation raises the
question of whether backward induction equilibria (say sequential equilibria) from the
extensive form can already be detected in the normal form of the game. This question
is important since it might be argued that, since a game is nothing but a collection
of simultaneous individual decision problems, all information that is needed to solve
these problems is already contained in the normal form of the game. The criteria for
self-enforcingness in the normal form are no di¤erent from those in the extensive form:
If the opponents of player i stick to s, then the essential information for i’s decision
problem is contained in this normal form: If i decides to deviate from s at a certain
information set h, he can already plan that deviation beforehand, hence, he can deviate
in the normal form. It turns out that the answer to the opening question is yes: An
equilibrium that is proper in the normal form induces a sequential equilibrium outcome
in every extensive form with that normal form.
Proper equilibria were introduced in Myerson (1978) with the aim eliminating certain
de…ciencies in Selten’s perfectness concept. One such de…ciency is that adding strictly
dominated strategies may enlarge the set of perfect equilibria. As an example, consider
the game from the right-hand side of Figure 3 with the strategy r1b eliminated. In this
2£ 2 game only (r1t; b) is perfect. If we then add the strictly dominated strategy r1b,
the equilibrium (l1; r2) becomes perfect. But, of course, strictly dominated strategies
should be irrelevant; they cannot determine whether or not an outcome is self-enforcing.
Myerson argues that, in Figure 3, player 2 should not believe that the mistake r1b is
more likely than r1t. On the contrary, since r1t dominates r1b, the mistake r1b is more
severe than the mistake r1t; player 1 may be expected to spend more e¤ort at preventing
41
it and as a consequence it will occur with smaller probability. In fact, Myerson’s concept
of proper equilibrium assumes such a more costly mistake to occur with a probability
that is of smaller order.
Formally, for a normal form game hA; ui and some " > 0, a strategy vector s" 2 S is
said to be an "-proper equilibrium if it is completely mixed (i.e. s"i (ai) > 0 for all i, all
ai 2 Ai) and satis…es
if ui(s"nai) < ui(s"nbi) then s"i (ai)  "s"i (bi) (all i; ai; bi): (3.8)
A strategy vector s 2 S is a proper equilibrium if it is a limit, as " ! 0, of a sequence
s" of "¡proper equilibria.
Myerson (1978) shows that each strategic form game has at least one proper equilibrium
and it is easily seen that any such equilibrium is perfect. Now, let g be an extensive
form game with semi-reduced normal form n(g) and, for " ! 0, let s" be an "-proper
equilibrium of n(g) with s" ! s as " ! 0. Since s" is completely mixed, it induces
a completely mixed behavior strategy ¹s" in g. Let ¹s = lim"!0 ¹s".Then ¹s is a behavior
strategy vector that induces the same outcome as s does, p¹s = ps. (Note that s need
not induce a full behavior strategy vector; as s was de…ned in the semi-reduced nor-
mal form, it does not necessarily specify a unique action at information sets that are
excluded by the players themselves). Condition (3.8) now implies that at each informa-
tion set h, ¹si assigns positive probability only to the pure actions at h that maximize
the local payo¤ at h against ¹s". Namely, if c is a best response at h and c0 is not, then
for each pure strategy in the normal form that prescribes to play c0 there exists a pure
strategy that prescribes to play c and that performs strictly better against s". (Take
strategies that di¤er only at h:) Condition (3.8) then implies that in the normal form
the total probability of the set of strategies choosing c0 is of smaller order than the total
probability of choosing c, hence, the limiting behavior strategy assigns probability 0 to
c0. Hence, we have shown that each player always maximizes his local payo¤, taking
the mistakes of opponents into account. In other words, using the terminology of Van
Damme (1984), the pro…le s is a quasi-perfect equilibrium. By the same argument, s
is a sequential equilibrium. Formally, let ¹" be the system of beliefs associated with
¹s" and let ¹ = lim"!0 ¹". Then the assessment (¹s; ¹) satis…es (3.6) and (3.7), hence, it
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is a sequential equilibrium of g. The following theorem summarizes the above discussion.
Theorem 10 (i) (Myerson (1978)). Every strategic form game has at least one
proper equilibrium. Every proper equilibrium is perfect.
(ii) (Van Damme (1984), Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). Let g be an extensive form
game with semi-reduced normal form n(g). If s is a proper equilibrium of n(g),
then ps is a quasi-perfect and a sequential equilibrium outcome in g.
Mailath et al. (1997) have shown that sorts of converses to Theorem 10(ii) hold as well.
Let fs"g be a converging sequence of completely mixed strategies in a semi-reduced
normal form game n(g). This sequence induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every
extensive form game with semi-reduced normal form n(g) if and only if the limit of fs"g
is a proper equilibrium that is supported by the sequence. It is important that the
same sequence be used: Hillas (1996) gives an example of a strategy pro…le that is not
proper and yet is quasi-perfect in every associated extensive form. Secondly, Mailath et
al. (1997) de…ne a concept of normal form sequential equilibrium and they show that
an equilibrium is normal form sequential if and only if it is sequential in every extensive
form game with that semi-reduced normal form.
Theorem 10 (ii) appears to be the main application of proper equilibrium. One other
application deserves to be mentioned: In 2-person zero-sum games, there is essentially
one proper equilibrium and it is found by the procedure of cautious exploitation of the
mistakes of the opponent that was proposed by Dresher (1961) (see Van Damme (1983,
Sect. 3.5)).
4 Forward induction and stable sets of equilibria
Unfortunately, as the game of Figure 5 (a modi…cation of a game discussed by Kohlberg
(1981)) shows, none of the concepts discussed thus far provides su¢cient conditions for
self-enforcingness. In this game player 1 …rst chooses between taking up an outside
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option that yields him 2 (and the opponent 0) and playing a battle-of-the-sexes game.
Player 2 only has to move when player 1 chooses to play the subgame. In this game player
1 taking up his option and players continuing with (w1; s2) in the subgame constitutes
a subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium is even perfect: player 2 can argue that
player 1 must have su¤ered from a sudden stroke of irrationality at his …rst move, but
that his player will come back to his senses before his second move and continue with
the plan (i.e. play w1) as if nothing had happened. In fact, the equilibrium (t; s2) is
even proper in the normal form of the game: properness allows player 2 to conclude that
the mistake pw1 is more likely than the mistake ps1 since pw1 is better than ps1 when















s1 3; 1 0; 0
w1 0; 0 1; 3
Figure 5: Battle of the sexes with an outside option
However, the outcome where player 1 takes up his option does not seem self-enforcing.
If player 1 deviates and decides to play the battle-of-the-sexes game, player 2 should
not rush to conclude that player 1 must have made a mistake; rather he might …rst
investigate whether he can give a rational interpretation of this deviation. In the case
at hand, such an explanation can indeed be given. For a rational player 1 it does not
make sense to play w1 in the subgame since the plan pw1 is strictly dominated by the
outside option. Hence, combining the rationality of player 1 with the fact that this
player chose to play the subgame, player 2 should come to the conclusion that player 1
intends to play s1 in the subgame, i.e. that player 1 bets on getting more than his option
and that player 2 is su¢ciently intelligent to understand this. Consequently, player 2
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should respond by w2, a move that makes the deviation of player 1 pro…table, hence,
the equilibrium is not self-enforcing.
Essentially what is involved here is an argument of forward induction: players’ deduc-
tions about other players should be consistent with the assumption that these players
are pursuing strategies that constitute rational plans for the overall game. The back-
ward induction requirements discussed before were local requirements only taking into
account rational behaviour in the future. Forward induction requires that players’ de-
ductions be based on overall rational behavior whenever possible and forces players to
take a global perspective. Hence, one is led to an analysis by means of the normal form.
In this section we take such a normal form perspective and ask how forward induction
can be formulated. The discussion will be based on the seminal work of Elon Kohlberg
and Jean-François Mertens (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Kohlberg (1989), Mertens
(1987, 1989ab, 1991)). At this stage the reader may wonder whether there is no loss of
information in moving to the normal form, i.e. whether the concepts that were discussed
before can be recovered in the normal form. Theorem 10(ii) already provides part of
the answer as it shows that sequential equilibria can be recovered. Mailath et al. (1993)
discuss the question in detail and they show that also subgames and subgame perfect
equilibria can be recovered in the normal form.
4.1 Set-valuedness as a consequence of desirable properties
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) contains a …rst and partial axiomatic approach to the
problem of what constitutes a self-enforcing agreement. (It should, however, be noted
that the authors stress that their requirements should not be viewed as axioms since
some of them are phrased in terms that are outside of decision theory.) Kohlberg and
Mertens argue that a solution of a game should:
(i) always exist,
(ii) be consistent with standard one-person decision theory,
(iii) be independent of irrelevant alternatives, and
(iv) be consistent with backward induction.
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(The third requirement states that strategies which certainly will not be used by ra-
tional players can have no in‡uence on whether a solution is self-enforcing; it is the
formalisation of the forward induction requirement that was informally discussed above;
it will be given a more precise meaning below.) In this subsection we will discuss these
requirements (except for (iv), which was extensively discussed in the previous section),
and show that they imply that a solution cannot just be a single strategy pro…le but
rather has to be a set of strategy pro…les. In the next subsection, we give formalized
versions of these basic requirements.
The existence requirement is fundamental and need not be discussed further. It guar-
antees that, if our necessary conditions for self-enforcingness leave only one candidate
solution, that solution is indeed self-enforcing. Without having an existence theorem,
we would run the risk of working with requirements that are incompatible, hence, of
proving vacuous theorems.
The second requirement from the above list follows from the observation that a game is
nothing but a simultaneous collection of one-person decision problems. In particular, it
implies that the solution of a game can depend only on the normal form of that game. As
a matter of fact, Kohlberg/Mertens argue that even less information than is contained
in the normal form should be su¢cient to decide on self-enforcingness. Namely, they
take mixed strategies seriously as actions, and argue that a player is always able to add
strategies that are just mixtures of strategies that are already explicitly given to them.
Hence, they conclude that adding or deleting such strategies can have no in‡uence on
self-enforcingness. Formally, de…ne the reduced normal form of a game as the game that
results when all pure strategies that are equivalent to mixtures of other pure strategies
have been deleted. (Hence, strategy ai 2 Ai is deleted if there exists s0i 2 Si with
s0i(ai) = 0 such that uj(sns0i) = uj(snai) for all j. The reader may ask whether the
reduced normal form is well-de…ned. We return to this issue in the next subsection.) As
a …rst consequence of consistency with one-person decision theory, Kohlberg/Mertens
insist that two games with the same reduced normal form be considered equivalent and,
hence, having the same solutions.
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Kohlberg/Mertens accept as a basic postulate from standard decision theory that a
rational agent will only choose undominated strategies, i.e. that he will not choose a
strategy that is weakly dominated. Hence, a second consequence of (ii) is that game solu-
tions should be undominated (admissible) as well. Furthermore, if players do not choose
undominated strategies, such strategies are actually irrelevant alternatives, hence, (iii)
requires that they can be deleted without changing the self-enforcingness of the solu-
tion. Hence, the combination of (ii) and (iii) implies that self-enforcing solutions should
survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Note that the requirement
of independence of dominated strategies is a “global” requirement that is applicable
independent of the speci…c game solution that is considered. Once one has a speci…c
candidate solution, one can argue that, if the solution is self-enforcing, no player will use
a strategy that is not a best response against the solution, and, hence, that such inferior
strategies should be irrelevant for the study of the self-enforcingness of the solution.
Consequently, Kohlberg/Mertens require as part of (iii) that a self-enforcing solution
remains self-enforcing when a strategy that is not a best response to this solution is
eliminated.
Note that “axioms” (ii) and (iii) force the conclusion that only (3,1) can be self-enforcing
in the game of Figure 5: only this outcome survives iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. The same conclusion can also be obtained without using such
iterative elimination: It follows from backward induction together with the requirement
that the solution should depend only on the reduced normal form. Namely, add to
the normal form of the game of Figure 5 the mixed strategy m = ¸t + (1¡ ¸)s1 with
1
2
< ¸ < 1 as an explicit pure strategy. The resulting game can be viewed as the normal
form associated with the extensive form game in which …rst player 1 decides between
the outside option t and playing a subgame with strategy sets fs1; w1;mg and fs2; w2g.
This extensive form game is equivalent to the extensive form from Figure 5, hence, they
should have the same solutions. However, the newly constructed game only has (3,1) as
a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (In the subgame w1 is strictly dominated by
m, hence player 2 is forced to play w2:)
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We will now show why (subsets of) the above “axioms” can only be satis…ed by set-
valued solution concepts. Consider the trivial game from Figure 6. Obviously, player 1
choosing his outside option is self-enforcing. The question is whether a solution should
contain a unique recommendation for player 2. Note that the unique subgame perfect





r2, hence, according to (i)
and (iv) this strategy should be the solution for player 2. However, according to (i), (ii),
and (iii), the solution should be l2 (eliminate the strategies in the order pl1; r2), while
according to these same axioms the solution should also be r2 (take the elimination
order pr1; l2). Hence, we see that, to guarantee existence, we have to allow for set-
valued solution concepts. Furthermore, we see that, even with set-valued concepts,
only weak versions of the axioms - that just require set inclusion - can be satis…ed.
Actually, these weak versions of the axioms imply that in this game all equilibria should
belong to the solution. Namely, add to the normal form of the game of Figure 6 the
mixed strategy ¸t + (1 ¡ ¸)pl1 with 0 < ¸ < 12 as a pure strategy. Then the resulting
game is the normal form of an extensive form game that has ¹l2 + (1 ¡ ¹)r2 with
¹ = (1¡ 2¸)=(2 ¡ ¸) as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for player 2.
Hence, as ¸ moves through (0; 1
2
), we trace half of the equilibrium set of player 2, viz.
the set f¹l2+(1¡¹)r2 : 0 < ¹ < 12g. The other half can be traced by adding the mixed
strategy ¸t+ (1¡ ¸)pr1 in a similar way. Hence, axioms (i), (ii) and (iv) imply that all















l1 1; 0 0; 1
r1 0; 1 1; 0
Figure 6: All Nash equilibria are equally good
The game of Figure 6 suggests that we should broaden our concept of a solution, that
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we should not always aim to give a unique strategy recommendation for a player at an
information set that can be reached only by irrational moves of other players. In the
game of Figure 6, it is unnecessary to give a speci…c recommendation to player 2 and
any such recommendation is somewhat arti…cial. Player 2 is dependent upon player 1 so
that his optimal choice seems to depend on the exact way in which player 1 is irrational.
However, our analysis has assumed rational players, and since no model of irrationality
has been provided, the theorist could be content to remain silent. Hence, a self-enforcing
solution should not necessarily pin down completely the behavior of players at unreached
points of the game tree. We may be satis…ed if we can recommend what players do in
those circumstances that are consistent with players being rational, i.e. as long as the
play is according to the self-enforcing solution.
Note that by extending our solution notion to allow for multiple beliefs and actions
after irrational moves we can also get rid of the unattractive assumption of persistent
rationality that was discussed in Section 3.2 and that corresponds to a narrow reading
of axiom (iv). We might just insist that a solution contains a backward induction
equilibrium, not that it consists exclusively of backward induction equilibria. We should
not fully exclude the possibility that a player just made a one-time mistake and will
continue to optimize, but we should not force this assumption. In fact, the axioms
imply that the solution of a perfect information game frequently cannot just consist of
the subgame perfect equilibrium. Namely, consider the game TOL(3) represented in
Figure 7, which is a variation of a game discussed in Reny (1993). (TOL(n) stands for
“Take it or leave it with n rounds“. The game starts with $1 on the table in round 1
and each time the game moves to a next round, the amount of money doubles. In round
t, the player i with i(mod2) = t(mod2) has to move. The game ends as soon as a player
takes the money; if the game continues till the end, each player receives $2n¡1 ¡ 1. (In








































(4; 0) (3; 3)
T2 L2
T1 1; 0 1; 0
L1t 0; 2 4; 0
L1l 0; 2 3; 3
Figure 7: The game TOL (3)
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of TOL(3) is (T1t; T2), which corresponds to
(T1; T2) in the semi-reduced normal form. If the solution of the game were just (T1; T2),
then L1t would not be a best reply against the solution and according to “axiom” (iii),
(T1; T2) should remain a solution when L1t is eliminated. However, in the resulting 2£2
game, the unique perfect equilibrium is (L1l; L2) so that the axioms force this outcome





T2 of player 2 has
to be part of the solution (in order to make L1t a best response against the solution):
player 1 cannot believe that, after player 2 has seen player 1 making the move L1, player
2 believes player 1 to be rational. Intuitively, stable sets have to be large since they
must incorporate the possibility of irrational play. Once we start eliminating dominated
and/or inferior strategies, we attribute more rationality to players, make them more
predictable and hence can make do with smaller stable sets. In formalizations of iterated
elimination, we naturally have set inclusion.
The question remains of what type of mathematical objects are candidates for solu-
tions of games now that we know that single strategy pro…les do not qualify. In the
above examples, the set of all equilibria was suggested, but the examples were special
since there was only one connected component of Nash equilibria. More generally, one
might consider connected components as solution candidates; however, this might be
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too coarse. For example, if, in Figure 6, we were to change player 2’s payo¤s in the
subgame in such a way as to make l2 strictly dominant, we would certainly recommend
player 2 to play l2 even if player 1 has made the irrational move. Hence, the answer
to the question appears unclear. Motivated by constructions like the above, and by the
interpretation of stable sets as patterns in which equilibria vary smoothly with beliefs or
presentation e¤ects, Kohlberg/Mertens suggest connected subsets of equilibria as solu-
tion candidates. Hence, a solution is a subset of a component of the equilibrium set (cf.
Theorem 2). Note that since a generic game has only …nitely many Nash equilibrium
outcomes (Theorem 7), all equilibria in the same connected component yield the same
outcome (since outcomes depend continuously on strategies); hence, for generic games
each Kohlberg/Mertens solution indeed generates a unique outcome. (See also Section
4.3.)
4.2 Desirable properties for strategic stability
In this subsection we rephrase and formalize (some consequences of) the requirements
(i)-(iv) from the previous subsection, taking the discussion from that subsection into
account.
Let ¡ be the set of all …nite games. A solution concept is a map S that assigns to each
game g 2 ¡ a collection of non-empty subsets of mixed strategy pro…les for the game. A
solution T of g is a subset T of the set of mixed strategies of (the normal form) of g with
T 2 S(g), hence, it is a set of pro…les that S allows. The …rst fundamental requirement
that we encountered in the previous subsection was:
(E) Existence: S(g) 6= ;
(We adopt the convention that, whenever a quanti…er is missing, it should be read
as “for all”, hence (E) requires existence of at least one solution for each game.) Sec-
ondly, we will accept Nash equilibrium as a necessary requirement for self-enforcingness:
(NE) Equilibrium: If T 2 S(g), then T ½ E(g)
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A third requirement discussed above was
(C) Connectedness: If T 2 S(g) then T is connected.
As discussed in the previous subsection, Kohlberg/Mertens insist that rational play-
ers only play admissible strategies. One formalization of admissibility is the restriction
to undominated strategies, i.e. strategies that are best responses to correlated strate-
gies of the opponents with full support. If players make their choices independently, a
stronger admissibility suggests itself, viz. each player chooses a best response against
a completely mixed strategy combination of the opponents. Formally, say that s0i is an
admissible best reply against s if there exists a sequence sk of completely mixed strat-
egy vectors converging to s such that s0i is a best response against any element in the
sequence. Write Bai (s) for the set of all such admissible best replies, Bai (s) = Bai (s)\Ai,
and let Ba(s) = XiBai (s). For any subset S 0 of S write Ba(S 0) = [s2S0Ba(s). We can
now write the admissibility requirement as:
(A) Admissibility: If T 2 S(g), then T ½ Ba(S):
Note that the combination of (NE) and (A) is almost equivalent to requiring perfec-
tion. The di¤erence is that, as (3.5) shows, perfectness requires the approximating
sequence sk to be the same for each player. Accepting that players only use admissible
best responses implies that a strategy that is not an admissible best response against
the solution is certain not to be played and, hence, can be eliminated. Consequently,
we can write the independence of irrelevant alternatives requirement as:
(IIA) Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If a 62 Bai (T ), then T contains a solu-
tion of the game in which a has been eliminated.
Note that Bai (T ) ½ Bi(T )\Bai (S), hence, (IIA) implies the requirements that strategies
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that are not best responses against the solution can be eliminated and that strategies
that are not admissible can be eliminated.
It is also a fundamental requirement that irrelevant players should have no in‡uence on
the solutions. Formally, following Mertens (1990), say that a subset J of the player set
constitutes a small world if their payo¤s do not depend on the actions of the players
not in J , i.e.
if sj = s0j for all j 2 J; then uj(s) = uj(s0) for all j 2 J: (4.1)
A solution has the small worlds property if the players outside the small world have no
in‡uence on the solutions inside the small world. Formally, if we write gJ for the game
played by the insiders, then
(SMW) Small worlds property: If J is a small world in g, then TJ is a solution in
gJ if and only if it is a projection of a solution T in g.
Closely related to the small worlds property is the decomposition property: If two
disjoint player sets play di¤erent games in di¤erent rooms, it does not matter whether
one analyses the games separately or jointly. Formally, say that g decomposes at J if
both J and ¹J = InJ are small worlds in g.
(D) Decomposition: If g decomposes at J, then T 2 S(g) if and only if T = TJ £ T ¹J
with Tk 2 S(gk) (k 2 fJ; ¹Jg):
We now discuss the “player splitting property” which deals with another form of decom-
position. Suppose g is an extensive form game and assume that there exists a partition
Pi of Hi (the set of information sets of player i) such that, if h; h0 belong to di¤erent
elements of Pi, there is no path in the tree that cuts both h and h0. In such a case,
the player can plan his actions at h without having to take into consideration his plans
at h0. More generally, plans at one element of the partition can be made indepen-
dently of plans at the other part and we do not limit the freedom of action of player
i if we replace this player by a collection of agents, one agent for each element of Pi.
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Consequently, we should require the two games to have the same self-enforcing solutions:
(PSP) Player splitting property: If g0 is obtained from g by splitting some player i
into a collection of independent agents, then S(g) = S(g0):
Note that for a solution concept having this property it does not matter whether a
signalling game (Kreps and Sobel (1994)) is analysed in normal form (also called the
Harsanyi-form in this case) or in agent normal form (also called the Selten-form). Also
note that in (PSP) the restriction to independent agents is essential: In the agent nor-
mal form of the game from Figure 5, the …rst agent of player 1 taking up his outside
option is a perfectly sensible outcome: Once the decisions are decoupled, the …rst action
cannot signal anything about the second action. We will return to this in Section 5.
We will now formalize the requirement that the solution of a game depends only an
those aspects of the problem that are relevant for the players’ individual decision prob-
lems, i.e. that the solution is ordinal (cf. Mertens (1987)). As already discussed above,
Mertens argues that rational players will only play admissible best responses. A natural
invariance requirement thus is that the solutions depend only on the admissible best-
reply correspondence, formally
(BRI) Best reply invariance: If Bag = Bag0 then, S(g) = S(g0):
Note that the application of (BRI) is restricted to games with the same player sets
and the same strategy spaces, hence, this requirement should be supplemented with
requirements that the names of the players and the strategies do not matter, etc.
In the previous subsection we also argued that games with the same reduced normal
form should be considered equivalent. In order to be able to properly formalize this
invariance requirement it turns out to be necessary to extend the domain of games
somewhat: After one has eliminated all equivalent strategies of a player, this player’s
strategy set need no longer be a full simplex. To deal with such possibilities, de…ne an
I-person strategic form game as a tuple hS;ui where S = XiSi is a product of compact
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polyhedral sets and u is a multilinear map on S. Note that each such strategic form
game has at least one equilibrium, and that the equilibrium set consists of …nitely many
connected components. Furthermore, all the requirements introduced above are mean-
ingful for strategic form games. Say that an I-person strategic form game g0 = hS 0; u0i is
a reduction of the I-person normal form game g = hA; ui if there exists a map f = (fi)i2I
with fi : Si ! S 0i being linear and surjective, such that u = u0 ± f , hence, f preserves
payo¤s. Call such a map f an isomorphism from g onto g0. The requirement that the
solution depends only on the reduced normal form may now be formalized as:
(I) Invariance: If f is an isomorphism from g onto g0, then S(g0) = ff(T ) : T 2 S(g)g
and f¡1(T 0) = [fT 2 S(g) : f(T ) = T 0g for all T 0 2 S(g0).
It should be stressed here that in Mertens (1987) the requirements (BRI) and (I) are
derived from more abstract requirements of ordinality.
The …nal requirement that was discussed in the previous subsection was the backwards
induction requirement, which, in view of Theorem 10, can be formalized as:
(BI) Backwards induction: If T 2 S(g), then T contains a proper equilibrium of g.
4.3 Stable sets of equilibria
In Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), three set-valued solution concepts are introduced that
aim to capture self-enforcingness. Unfortunately, each of these fails to satisfy at least
one of the above requirements so that that seminal paper does not come up with a
de…nite answer as to what constitutes a self-enforcing outcome. The de…nitions of these
concepts build on Theorem 3 that describes the structure of the Nash equilibrium cor-
respondence. The idea is to look at components of Nash equilibria that are robust to
slight perturbations in the data of the game. The structure theorem implies that at
least one such component exists. By varying the class of perturbations that are allowed,
di¤erent concepts are obtained. Formally de…ne
(i)T is a stable set of equilibria of g if it is minimal among all the closed sets of equilibria
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T 0 that have the property that each perturbed game g";¾ with " close to zero has an
equilibrium close to T 0.
(ii)T is a fully stable set of equilibria of g if it is minimal among all the closed sets of
equilibria T 0 that have the property that each game hS 0; ui with S 0i a polyhedral set in
the interior of S 0i (for each i) that is close to g has an equilibrium close to T
0.
(iii)T is a hyperstable set of equilibria of g if it is minimal among all the closed sets of
equilibria T 0 that have the property that for each game g0 = hA0; u0i that is equivalent to
g and for each small payo¤ perturbation hA0; u"i of g0 there exists an equilibrium close
to T 0.
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) show that every hyperstable set contains a set that is
fully stable and that every fully stable set contains a stable set. Furthermore, from
Theorem 3 they show that every game has a hyperstable set that is contained in a
single connected component of Nash equilibria and, hence, that the same property holds
for fully stable sets and stable sets. They, however, reject the (preliminary) concepts of
hyperstability and full stability because these don’t satisfy the admissibility requirement.
Kohlberg/Mertens write that stability seems to be the “right” concept but they are
forced to reject it since it violates (C) and (BI). (This concept does satisfy (E), (NE),
(A), (IIA), (BRI), and (I).) Kohlberg/Mertens conclude with “we hope that in the future
some appropriately modi…ed de…nition of stability will, in addition, imply connectedness
and backwards induction.” Mertens (1989, 1991) gives such a modi…cation. We will
consider it below.
An example of a game in which every fully stable set contains an inadmissible equilibrium
(and hence in which every hyperstable set contains such an equilibrium) is obtained by
changing the payo¤ vector (0; 2) in TOL(3) (Figure 7) to (5; 5). The unique admissible
equilibrium then is (L1t; T2) but every fully stable set has to contain the strategy (L1l)
of player 1. Namely, if (in the normal form) player 1 trembles with a larger probability
to T1 when playing L1t than when playing L1l, we obtain a perturbed game in which
only (L1l; T2) is an equilibrium.
We now describe a 3-person game (attributed to Faruk Gul in Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986)) that shows that stable sets may contain elements from di¤erent equilibrium
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components and need not contain a subgame perfect equilibrium. Player 3 starts the
game by choosing between an outside option T (which yields payo¤s (0; 0; 2)) or playing
a simultaneous move subgame with players 1 and 2 in which each of the three players
has strategy set fa; bg and in which the payo¤s are as in the matrix from the left-hand
side of Figure 8 (x; y 2 fa; bg; x 6= y). Hence, players 1 and 2 have identical payo¤s and
they want to make the same choice as player 3. Player 3 prefers these players to make
di¤erent choices, but, if they make the same choice, he wants his choice to be di¤erent
from theirs.
x y
x 3; 3; 0 1; 1; 5
y 1; 1; 5 0; 0; 1
x
a b
a 3a3; 3a3 1; 1



















Figure 8: Stable sets need not contain a subgame
perfect equilibrium
The game g described in the above story has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium:




b in this subgame.
This strategy vector constitutes a singleton component of the set of Nash equilibria. In
addition, there are two components in which player 3 takes up his option T . Writing
ai (resp. bi) for the probability with which player i (i = 1; 2) chooses a (resp. b), the
strategies of players 1 and 2 in this component are the solutions to the pair of inequalities
4(a1 + a2) ¡ 9a1a2  1 and 4(b1 + b2)¡ 9b1b2  1: (4.2)
Note that the solution set of (4.2) indeed consists of two connected components, one
around (a; a) (i.e. a1 = a2 = 1) and one around (b; b). Now, let us look at perturbations
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of (the normal form of) g. If player 3 chooses to play the subgame with positive stability
" and if, conditional on such a mistake, he chooses a (resp. b) with probability a3 (resp.
b3), players 1 and 2 face the game from the right-hand side of Figure 8. The equilibria





0 if a3 < 13





hence, restricted to players 1 and 2, each perturbed game has (a; a) or (b; b) (or both)
as a strict equilibrium. If players 1 and 2 coordinate on any of these strict equilibria,
player 3 strictly prefers to play T , hence, f(a1; a2; T ); (b1; b2; T )g is a stable set of g.
Obviously, this set does not contain the subgame perfect equilibrium, it even yields a
di¤erent outcome.
A closer investigation may reveal the source of the di¢culty and suggest a resolution of
the problem. Since problematic zero-probability events arise only from player 3 choosing
T , let us insist that he chooses to play the subgame with probability " but, for simplicity,
let us not perturb the strategies of players 1 and 2. Formally, consider a perturbed game
g";¾ with "1 = "2 = 0; "3 = " > 0 and ¾3 = (0; ®; 1 ¡ ®), hence ® is the probability
that player 3 chooses a if he makes a mistake. The middle panel in Figure 8 displays,
for any small " > 0, the equilibrium correspondence as a function of ®. (The horizontal
axis corresponds to ®, the vertical one to ai:) Each perturbed game has an equilibrium
close to the subgame perfect equilibrium of g. This equilibrium is represented by the
horizontal line at ai = 12 . The inverted z-shaped …gure corresponds to the solutions of
(4.3). If players 1 and 2 play such a solution that is su¢ciently close to a pure strategy,
then T is the unique best response of player 3, hence, in that case we have an equilibrium
of the perturbed game with a3 = ®. If players 1 and 2 play a solution of (4.3) that is
su¢ciently close to ai = 12 (i.e. they choose ai 2 (¹ai; ai) corresponding to the dashed




, then the unique best response of player 3 is to play b, hence a3 = "® < 13 so that
by (4.3) we should have ai = 0:) The points ® and ¹® where the solid z-curve changes
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into the dashed z-curve are somewhat special. Writing ai = 2¡ 3® we have that if each
player i (i = 1; 2) chooses a with probability ai, then player 3’s best responses are T
and b. Consequently, by playing b voluntarily with the appropriate probability, player
3 can enforce any a3 2 ("®; ®), hence, if " is su¢ciently small and ® > ®, player 3 can
enforce a3 = ®. We see that for each ® ¸ ®, the perturbed game has an equilibrium
with ai = ai. In the diagram, this branch is represented by the horizontal line at ai.
Of course, there is a similar branch at ¹ai. Since the above search was exhaustive, the
middle panel in Figure 8 contains a complete description of the equilibrium graph, or
at least of its projection on the (®; ai)-space.
The critical di¤erence between the “middle” branch of the equilibrium correspondence
and each of the other two branches is that in the latter cases it is possible to continuously
deform the graph, leaving the part over the extreme perturbations (® 2 f0; 1g) intact,
in such a way that the interior is no longer covered, i.e. such that there are no longer
“equilibria” above the positive perturbations. Hence, although the projection from the
union of the top and bottom branches to the perturbations is surjective (as required by
stability), this projection is homologically trivial, i.e. it is homologous to the identity
map of the boundary of the space of perturbations. Building on this observation, and
on the topological structure of the equilibrium correspondence more generally, Mertens
(1989, 1991) proposes a re…nement of stability (to be called M-stability) that essentially
requires that the projection from a neighborhood of the set to a neighborhood of the
game should be homologically nontrivial. As the formal de…nition is somewhat involved
we will not give it here but con…ne ourselves to stating its main properties. Let us,
however, note that Mertens does not insist on minimality; he shows that this con‡icts
with the ordinality requirement (cf. Section 4.5).
Theorem 11 (Mertens (1989, 1990, 1991)). M-stable sets are closed sets of normal
form perfect equilibria that satisfy all properties listed in the previous subsection.
We close this subsection with a remark and with some references to recent literature.
First of all, we note that also in Hillas (1990) a concept of stability is de…ned that satis…es
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all properties from the list of the previous subsection (We will refer to this concept as
H-stability. To avoid confusion, we will refer to the stability concept that was de…ned
in Kohlberg and Mertens as KM-stability.) T is an H-stable set of equilibria of g if it is
minimal among all the closed sets of equilibria T 0 that have the following property: each
upper-hemicontinuous compact convex-valued correspondence that is pointwise close to
the best-reply correspondence of a game that is equivalent to g has a …xed point close to
T 0. The solution concept of H-stable sets satis…es the requirements (E), (NE), (C), (A),
(IIA), (BRI), (I) and (BI), but it does not satisfy the other requirement from Section
4.2. (The minimality requirement forces H-stable sets to be connected, hence, in the
game of Figure 8 only the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is H-stable.) In Hillas
et al. (1999) it is shown that each M-stable set contains an H-stable set. That paper
discusses a couple of other related concepts as well.
I conclude this Section by referring to some other recent work. Wilson (1997) discusses
the role of admissibility in identifying self-enforcing outcomes. He argues that admis-
sibility criteria should be deleted when selecting among equilibrium components, but
that they may be used in selecting equilibria from a component, hence, Wilson argues
in favour of perfect equilibria in essential components, i.e. components for which the
degree (cf. Section 2.3) is non-zero. Govindan and Wilson (1999) show that, in 2-player
games, maximal M-stable sets are connected components of perfect equilibria, hence,
such sets are relatively easy to compute and their number is …nite (On …niteness, see
Hillas et al. (1997).) The result implies that an essential component contains a stable
set, however, as Govindan/Wilson illustrate by means of several examples, inessential
components may contain stable sets as well.
4.4 Applications of stability criteria
Concepts related to strategic stability have been frequently used to narrow down the
number of equilibrium outcomes in games arising in economic contexts. (Recall that in
generic extensive games all equilibria in the same component have the same outcome
so that we can speak of stable and unstable outcomes.) Especially in the context of
signalling games many re…nements have been proposed that were inspired by stability
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or by its properties (cf. Cho and Kreps (1987), Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and
Sobel (1990)). As this literature is surveyed in the chapter by Kreps and Sobel (1994),
there is no need to discuss these applications here (see Van Damme (1992)). I’ll con…ne
myself here to some easy applications and to some remarks on examples where the …ne
details of the de…nitions make the di¤erence.
It is frequently argued that the Folk Theorem, i.e. the fact that repeated games have a
plethora of equilibrium outcomes (see chapter 4 in this Handbook) shows a fundamental
weakness of game theory. However, in a repeated game only few outcomes may actually
be strategically stable. (General results, however, are not yet available.) To illustrate,
consider the twice-repeated battle-of-the-sexes game, where the stage game payo¤s are
as in (the subgame occurring in) Figure 5 and that is played according to the standard
information conditions. The path h(s1; w2); (s1; w2)i in which player 1’s most preferred
stage equilibrium is played twice is not stable. Namely, the strategy s2w2 (i.e. deviate
to s2 and then play w2) is not a best response against any equilibrium that supports
this path, hence, if the path were stable, then according to (IIA) it should be possible
to delete this strategy. However, the resulting game does not have an admissible equi-
librium with payo¤ (6; 2) so that the path cannot be stable. (Admissibility forces player
1 to respond with w1 after 2 has played s2; hence, the deviation s2s2 is pro…table for
player 2.) For further results on stability in repeated games, the reader is referred to
Balkenborg (1993), Osborne (1990), Ponssard (1991) and Van Damme (1989a).
Stability implies that the possibility to in‡ict damage on oneself confers power. Suppose
that before playing the one-shot battle-of-the-sexes game, player 1 has the opportunity
to burn 1 unit of utility in a way that is observable to player 2. Then the only stable out-
come is the one in which player 1 does not burn utility and players play (s1; w1), hence,
player 1 gets his most preferred outcome. The argument is simply that the game can
be reduced to this outcome by using (IIA). If both players can throw away utility, then
stability forces utility to be thrown away with positive probability: Any other outcome
can be upset by (IIA). (See Van Damme (1989a) for further details and Ben Porath and
Dekel (1992), Bagwell and Ramey (1996), Glazer and Weiss (1990) for applications.)
Most applications of stability in economics use the requirements from Section 4.2 to limit
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the set of solution candidates to one and they then rely on the existence theorem to con-
clude that the remaining solution must be stable. Direct veri…cation of stability may be
di¢cult one may have to enumerate all perturbed games and investigate how the equi-
librium graph hangs together (see Mertens (1987, 1989, 1991) for various illustrations of
this procedure and for arguments as to why certain shortcuts may not work). Recently,
Wilson (1992) has constructed an algorithm to compute a simply stable component of
equilibria in bimatrix games. Simply stable sets are robust against a restricted set of
perturbations, viz. one perturbs only one strategy (either its probability or its payo¤).
Wilson amends the Lemke/Howson algorithm from Section 2.3 to make it applicable
to nongeneric bimatrices and he adds a second stage to it to ensure that it can only
terminate at a simply stable set. Whenever the Lemke/Howson algorithm terminates
with an equilibrium that is not strict, Wilson uses a perturbation to transit onto another
path. The algorithm terminates only when all perturbations have been covered by some
vertex in the same component. Unfortunately, Wilson cannot guarantee that a simply
stable component is actually stable.
In Van Damme (1989) it was argued that stable sets (as originally de…ned by Kohlberg/
Mertens) may not fully capture the logic of forward induction. Following an idea origi-
nally discussed in McLennan (1985) it was argued that if an information set h 2 Hi can
be reached only by one equilibrium s¤, and if s¤ is self-enforcing, player i should indeed
believe that s¤ is played if h is reached and, hence, only s¤ih should be allowed at h. A
2-person example in Van Damme (1989) showed that stable equilibria need not satisfy
this forward induction requirement. (Actually Gul’s example (Figure 8) already shows
this.) Hauk and Hurkens (1999) have recently shown that this forward-induction prop-
erty is satis…ed by none of the stability concepts discussed above. On the other hand
they show that this property is satis…ed by some evolutionary equilibrium concepts that
are related to those discussed in Section 4.5 below.
Gul and Pearce (1996) argue that forward induction loses much of its power when
public randomization is allowed; however, Govindan and Robson (1998) show that the
Gul/Pearce argument depends essentially on the use of inadmissible strategies.
Mertens (1992) describes a game in which each player has a unique dominant strategy,
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yet the pair of these dominant strategies is not perfect in the agent normal form. Hence,
the M-stable sets of the normal form and those of the agent normal form may be disjoint.
That same paper also contains an example of a nongeneric perfect information game
(where ties are not noticed when doing the backwards induction where the unique M-
stable set contains other outcomes besides the backwards induction outcome). (See also
Van Damme (1987b), pp. 32-33.)
Govindan (1995) has applied the concept of M-stability to the Kreps and Wilson (1982b)
chain store game with incomplete information. He shows that only the outcome that
was already identi…ed in Kreps and Wilson (1982b) as the unique “reasonable” one,
is indeed the unique M-stable outcome. Govindan’s approach is to be preferred above
Kreps and Wilson’s since it does not rely on ad hoc methods. It is worth remarking
that Govindan is able to reach his conclusion just by using the properties of M-stable
equilibria (as mentioned in Theorem 11) and that the connectedness requirement plays
an important role in the proof.
4.5 Robustness and persistent equilibria
Many game theorists are not convinced that equilibria in mixed strategies should be
treated on equal footing with pure, strict equilibria; they express a clear preference
for pure equilibria. For example, Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 198) write “Games
that arise in the context of economic theory often have many strict equilibrium points.
Obviously in such cases it is more natural to select a strict equilibrium point rather than
a weak one. Of course, strict equilibrium points are not always available (...) but it is
still possible to look for a principle that helps us to avoid those weak equilibrium points
that are especially unstable.” (They use the term “strong” where I write “strict”). In
this subsection we discuss such principles.
Harsanyi and Selten discuss two forms of instability associated with mixed strategy
equilibria. The …rst, weak form of instability results from the fact that even though a
player might have no incentive to deviate from a mixed equilibrium, he has no positive
incentive to play the equilibrium strategy either: any pure strategy that is used with
positive probability is equally good. As we have seen in Section 2.5, the reinterpretation
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of mixed equilibria as equilibria in beliefs provides an adequate response to the criticism
that is based on this form of instability. The second, strong form of instability is more
serious and cannot be countered so easily. This form of instability results from the fact
that, in a mixed equilibrium, if a player’s beliefs di¤er even slightly from the equilibrium
beliefs, optimizing behavior will typically force the player to deviate from the mixed
equilibrium strategy. In contrast, if an equilibrium is strict, a player is forced to play his
equilibrium strategy as long as he assigns a su¢ciently high probability to the opponents
playing this equilibrium. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes game (that occurs as
the subgame in Figure 5), each player is willing to follow the recommendation to play a
pure equilibrium as long as he believes that the opponent follows the recommendation
with a probability of at least 2
3
. In contrast, player i is indi¤erent between si and wi
only if he assigns a probability of exactly 1
3
to the opponent playing wj. Hence, it seems
that strict equilibria possess a type of robustness property that the mixed equilibrium
lacks. However, this di¤erence is not picked up by any of the stability concepts that have
been discussed above: The mixed strategy equilibrium of the battle-of-the-sexes game
constitutes a singleton stable set according to each of the above stability de…nitions. In
this subsection, we will discuss some set-valued generalizations of strict equilibria that
do pick up the di¤erence. They all aim at capturing the idea that equilibria should be
robust to small trembles in the equilibrium beliefs, hence, they address the question of
what outcome an outsider would predict who is quite sure, but not completely sure,
about the players’ beliefs. The discussion that follows is inspired by Balkenborg (1992).
If s is a strict equilibrium of g = hA; ui, then s is the unique best response against s,
hence fsg = B(s). We have already encountered a set-valued analogue of this uniqueness
requirement in Section 2.2, viz. the concept of a minimal curb set. Recall that C ½ A
is a curb set of g if
B(C) ½ C; (4.4)
i.e. if every best reply against beliefs that are concentrated on C again belongs to C.
Obviously, a singleton set C satis…es (4.4) only if it is a strict equilibrium. Nonsingleton
curb sets may be very large (for example, the set A of all strategy pro…les trivially
satis…es (4.4)), hence in order to obtain more de…nite predictions, one can investigate
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minimal sets with the property (4.4). In Section 2.2 we showed that such minimal curb
sets exist, that they are tight, i.e. B(C) = C, and that distinct minimal curb sets are
disjoint. Furthermore, curb sets possess the same neighborhood stability property as
strict equilibria, viz. if C satis…es (4.4), then there exists a neighborhood U of Xi¢(Ci)
in S such that
B(U) ½ C: (4.5)
Despite all these nice properties, minimal curb sets do not seem to be the appropriate
generalization of strict equilibria. First, if a player i has payo¤ equivalent strategies,
then (4.4) requires all of these to be present as soon as one is present in the set, but
optimizing behavior certainly doesn’t force this conclusion: It is su¢cient to have at least
one member of the equivalence class in the curb set. (Formally, de…ne the strategies
s0i and s
00
i of player i to be i-equivalent if ui(sns0i) = ui(sns00i ) for all s 2 S, and write
s0i »i s00i if s0i and s00i are i-equivalent.) Secondly, requirement (4.4) does not di¤erentiate
among best responses, it might be preferable to work with the narrower set of admissible
best responses. As a consequence of these two observations, curb sets may include too
many strategies and minimal curb sets do not provide a useful generalization of the
strict equilibrium concept.
Kalai and Samet’s (1984) concept of persistent retracts doesn’t su¤er from the two
drawbacks mentioned above. Roughly, this concepts results when requirement (4.5) is
weakened to “B(s)\C 6= ; for any s 2 U“. Formally, de…ne a retract R as a Cartesian
product R = XiRi where each Ri is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of Si. A retract
is said to be absorbing if
B(s) \R 6= ; for all s in a neighbourhood U of R; (4.6)
that is, if against any small perturbation of strategy pro…le in R there exists a best
response that is in R. A retract is de…ned to be persistent if it is a minimal absorb-
ing retract. Zorn’s lemma implies that persistent retracts exist; an elementary proof
is indicated below. Kakutani’s …xed point theorem implies that each absorbing retract
contains a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium that belongs to a persistent retract
is called a persistent equilibrium. A slight modi…cation of Myerson’s proof for the exis-
tence of proper equilibrium actually shows that each absorbing retract contains a proper
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equilibrium. Hence, each game has an equilibrium that is both proper and persistent.
Below we give examples to show that a proper equilibrium need not be persistent and
that a persistent equilibrium need not be proper.
Note that each strict equilibrium is a singleton persistent retract. The reader can easily
verify that in the battle-of-the-sexes game only the pure equilibria are persistent and
that (in the normal form of) the overall game in Figure 5 only the equilibrium (ps1; w2)
is persistent, hence, in this example, persistency selects the forward induction outcome.
As a side remark, note that ¹s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if f¹sg = R is a minimal
retract with the property “B(s) \ R 6= ; for all s 2 R”, hence, persistency corresponds
to adding neighborhood robustness to the Nash equilibrium requirement.
Kalai and Samet (1984) show that persistent retracts have a very simple structure, viz.
they contain at most one representative from each i-equivalence class of strategies for
each player i. To establish this result, Kalai and Samet …rst note that two strategies s0i
and s00i are i-equivalent if and only if there exists an open set U in S such that, against
any strategy in U , s0i and s
00
i are equally good. Hence, it follows that, up to equivalence,
the best response of a player is unique (and pure) on an open and dense subset of S.
Note that, to a certain extent, a strategy that is not a best response against an open
set of beliefs is super‡uous, i.e. a player always has a best response that is also a best
response to an open set in the neighborhood. Let us call s0i a robust best response against
s if there exists an open set U 2 S with s in its closure such that s0i is a best response
against all elements in U . (Balkenborg (1992) uses the term semi-robust best response,
in order to avoid confusion with Okada’s (1983) concept.) Write Bri (s) for all robust best
responses of player i against s and Br(s) = XiBri (s). Note that Br(s) ½ Ba(s) ½ B(s)
for all s. Also note that a mixed strategy is a robust best response only if it is a mixture
of equivalent pure robust best responses. Hence, up to equivalence, robustness restricts
players to using pure strategies. Finally, note that an outside observer, who is somewhat
uncertain about the players’ beliefs and who represents this uncertainty by continuous
distributions on S, will assign positive probability only to players playing robust best
responses.
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The reader can easily verify that (4.6) is equivalent to
if s 2 R and a 2 Bri (s) then a »i s0i for some s0i 2 Ri (all i; s): (4.7)
Hence, up to equivalence, all robust best responses against the retract must belong to
the absorbing retract. Minimality thus implies that a persistent retract contains at
most one representative from each equivalence class of robust best responses. From this
observation it follows that there exists an absorbing retract that is spanned by pure
strategies and that there exists at least one persistent retract. (Consider the set of all
retracts that are spanned by pure strategies. The set is …nite, partially ordered and
the maximal element (R = S) is absorbing, hence, there exists a minimal element.) Of
course, for generic strategic form games, no two pure strategies are equivalent and any
pure best response is a robust best response. For such games it thus follows that R is a
persistent retract if and only if there exists a minimal curb set C such that Ri = ¢(Ci)
for each player i.
We will now investigate which properties from Section 4.2 are satis…ed by persistent
retracts. We have already seen that persistent retracts exist; they are connected and
contain a proper equilibrium. Hence, the properties (E), (C), and (BI) hold. Also (IIA)
is satis…ed, as follows easily from (4.7) and the fact that Br(s) ½ Ba(s). Also (BRI)
follows easily from (4.7). However, persistent retracts do not satisfy (NE). For example,
in the matching pennies game the entire set of strategies is the unique persistent retract.
Of course, persistency satis…es a weak form of (NE): any persistent retract contains a
Nash equilibrium. In fact, it can be shown that each persistent retract contains a stable
set of equilibria. (This is easily seen for stability as de…ned by Kohlberg and Mertens,
Mertens (1990) proves it for M-stability and Balkenborg (1992) proves the property for
H-stable sets.) Similarly, persistency satis…es a weak form of (A): (4.7) implies that
if R is a persistent retract and si is an extreme point of Ri, then si is a robust best
response, hence, si is admissible. Consequently, property (A) holds for the extreme
points of R, and each element in R only assigns positive probability to admissible pure
strategies. This, however, does not imply that the elements of R are themselves admis-
sible. For example, in the game of Figure 9, the only persistent retract is the entire










; 0); (0; 0; 1)i is persistent but not perfect.
3; 0 0; 3 0; 2
0; 3 3; 0 0; 2
2; 0 2; 0 0; 0
Figure 9: A persistent equilibrium need not be perfect
Persistent retracts are not invariant. In Figure 9, replace the payo¤ “2” by “3
2
” so that




; 0). The unique persistent re-




; 0), but it does not contain the equivalent strategy
(0; 0; 1). Hence, the invariance requirement (I) is violated. Balkenborg (1992), however,
shows that the extreme points of a persistent retract satisfy (I). He also shows that this
set of extreme points satis…es the small worlds property (SWP) and the decomposition
property (D).
A serious drawback of persistency is that it does not satisfy the player splitting property:
The agent normal form and the normal form of an incomplete information game can have
di¤erent persistent retracts. The reason is that the normal form forces di¤erent types to
have the same beliefs about the opponent, whereas the Selten form (i.e. the agent normal
form) allows di¤erent types to have di¤erent conjectures. (Cf. our discussion in Section
2.2.) Perhaps it is even more serious that also other completely inessential changes
in the game may induce changes in the persistent retracts and may make equilibria
persistent that were not persistent before. As an example, consider the game from
Figure 5 in which only the outcome (3; 1) is persistent. Now change the game such that,
when (pw1; w2) is played, the players don’t receive zero right away, but are rather forced
to play a matching pennies game. Assume players simultaneously choose “heads” or
“tails”, that player 1 receives 4 units from player 2 if choices match and that he has to
pay 4 units if choices di¤er. The change is completely inessential (the game that was
added has unique optimal strategies and value zero), but it has the consequence that
in the normal form, only the entire strategy space is persistent. In particular, player
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1 taking up his outside option is a persistent and proper equilibrium outcome of the
modi…ed game.
For applications of persistent equilibria the reader is referred to Kalai and Samet (1985),
Hurkens (1996), Hurkens and Van Damme (1996), Blume (1994, 1996), and Balkenborg
(1993). Kalai and Samet consider “repeated” unanimity games. In each of …nitely
many periods, players simultaneously announce an outcome. The game stops as soon as
players announce that same outcome, and then that outcome is implemented. Kalai and
Samet show that if there are at least as many rounds as there are outcomes, players will
agree on an e¢cient outcome in a (symmetric) persistent equilibrium. Hurkens (1996)
analyzes situations in which some players can publicly burn utility before the play of a
game. He shows that if the players who have this option have common interests (Aumann
and Sorin (1989)), then only the outcome that these players prefer most is persistent.
Hurkens and Van Damme (1996) study games in which players have common interests
and in which the timing of the moves is endogenous. They show that persistency forces
players to coordinate on the e¢cient equilibrium. Blume (1994, 1996) applies persistency
to a class of signalling games and he also obtains that persistent equilibria have to be
e¢cient. Balkenborg (1993) studies …nitely repeated common interest games. He shows
that persistent equilibria are almost e¢cient.
The picture that emerges from these applications (as well as from some theoretical
considerations not discussed here, see Van Damme (1992)) is that persistency might
be more relevant in an evolutionary and/or learning context, rather than in the pure
deductive context we have assumed in this chapter. Indeed, Hurkens (1995) discusses
an explicit learning model in which play eventually settles down in a persistent retract.
The following proposition summarizes the main elements from the discussion in this
section:
Theorem 12 (i) (Kalai and Samet (1985)). Every game has a persistent retract.
Each persistent retract contains a proper equilibrium. Each strategy in a persistent
retract assigns positive probability only to robust best replies.
(ii) (Balkenborg (1992)). For generic strategic form games, persistent retracts corre-
spond to minimal curb sets.
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(iii) (Balkenborg (1992)). Persistent retracts satisfy the properties (E), (C), (IIA),
(BRI) and (BI) from Section 4.2, but violate the other properties. The set of
extreme points of persistent retracts satis…es (SWP), (D) and (I).
(iv) (Mertens (1990), Balkenborg (1992)). Each persistent retract contains an M-stable
set. It also contains an H-stable set as well as a KM-stable set.
5 Equilibrium selection
Up to now this paper has been concerned just with the …rst and basic question of
noncooperative game theory: Which outcomes are self-enforcing? The starting point of
our investigations was that being a Nash equilibrium is necessary but not su¢cient for
self-enforcingness, and we have reviewed several other necessary requirements that have
been proposed. We have seen that frequently even the most stringent re…nements of
the Nash concept allow multiple outcomes. For example, many games admit multiple
strict equilibria and any such equilibrium passes every test of self-enforcingness that has
been proposed up to now. In the introduction, however, we already argued that the
“theory” rationale of Nash equilibrium relies essentially on the assumption that players
can coordinate on a single outcome. Hence, we have to address the questions of when,
why and how players can reach such a coordinated outcome. One way in which such
coordination might be achieved is if there exists a convincing theory of rationality that
selects a unique outcome in every game and if this theory is common knowledge among
the players. One such theory of equilibrium selection has been proposed in Harsanyi and
Selten (1988). In this section we will review the main building blocks of that theory.
The theory from Harsanyi and Selten may be seen as derived from three basic pos-
tulates, viz. that a theory of rationality should make a recommendation that is (i) a
unique strategy pro…le, (ii) self-enforcing, and (iii) universally applicable. The latter re-
quirement says that no matter the context in which the game arises, the theory should
apply. It is a strong form of history-independence. Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp.
342-43) refer to it as the assumption of endogenous expectations: the solution of the
game should depend only on the mathematical structure of the game itself, no matter
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the context in which this structure arises. The combination of these postulates is very
powerful; for example, one implication is that the solution of a symmetric game should
be symmetric. The postulates also force an agent normal form perspective: once a sub-
game is reached, only the structure of the subgame is relevant, hence, the solution of
a game has to project onto the solution of the subgame. Harsanyi and Selten refer to
this requirement as “subgame consistency”. It is a strong form of the requirement of
“persistent rationality” that was extensively discussed in Section 3. Of course, subgame
consistency is naturally accompanied by the axiom of truncation consistency: to …nd the
overall solution of the game it should be possible to replace a subgame by its solution.
Indeed, Harsanyi and Selten insist on truncation consistency as well. It should now
be obvious that the requirements that Harsanyi and Selten impose are very di¤erent
from the requirements that we discussed in Section 4.2. Indeed the requirements are
incompatible. For example, the Harsanyi/Selten requirements imply that the solution
of the game from Figure 5 is (tm1;m2) where mi = 14si +
3
4
wi. Symmetry requires the
solution of the subgame to be (m1;m2) and the axioms of subgame and truncation con-
sistency prevent player 1 from signalling anything. If one accepts the Harsanyi/Selten
postulates, then it is common knowledge that the battle-of-the-sexes subgame has to
be played according to the mixed equilibrium, hence, if he has to play, player 2 must
conclude that player 1 has made a mistake. Note that uniqueness of the solution is
already incompatible with the pair (I), (BI) from Section 4.2. We showed that (I) and
(BI) leave only the payo¤ (3; 1) in the game of Figure 5, hence, uniqueness forces (3; 1)
as the unique solution of the “battle of the sexes”. However, if we would have given the
outside option to player 2 rather than to player 1, we would have obtained (1; 3) as the
unique solution. Hence, to guarantee existence, the approach from Section 4 must give
up uniqueness, i.e. it has to allow multiple solutions. Both (3,1) and (1,3) have to be
admitted as solutions of the battle-of-the-sexes game, in order to allow the context in
which the game is played to determine which of these equilibria will be selected. The ap-
proach to be discussed in this section, which requires context independence, is in sharp
con‡ict with that from the previous section. However, let us note that, although the two
approaches are incompatible, each of the approaches corresponds to a coherent point
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of view. We con…ne ourselves to presenting both points of view, to allow the reader to
make up his own mind.
5.1 Overview of the Harsanyi/Selten solution procedure
The procedure proposed by Harsanyi and Selten to …nd the solution of a given game
generates a number of “smaller” games which have to be solved by the same procedure.
The process of reduction and elimination should continue until …nally a basic game is
reached which cannot be scaled down any further. The solution of such a basic game can
be determined by applying the tracing procedure to which we will return below. Hence,
the theory consists of a process of reducing a game to a collection of basic games, a rule
for solving each basic game, and a procedure for aggregating these basic solutions to a
solution of the overall game. The solution process may be said to consist of …ve main
steps, viz. (i) initialization, (ii) decomposition, (iii) reduction, (iv) formation splitting,
and (v) solution using dominance criteria. To describe these steps in somewhat greater
detail, we …rst introduce some terminology.
The Harsanyi/Selten theory makes use of the so-called standard form of a game, a form
that is in between the extensive form and the normal form. Formally, the standard form
consists of the agent normal form together with information about which agents belong
to the same player. Write I for the set of players in the game and for each i 2 I , let
Hi = fij : j 2 Jig be the set of agents of player i. Writing H = [iHi for the set of all
agents in the game, a game in standard form is a tuple g = hA; uiH where A = XijAij
with Aij being the action set of agent ij, and ui : A! R for each player i. Harsanyi and
Selten work with this form since on the one hand they want to guarantee perfectness
in the extensive form, while on the other hand they want di¤erent agents of the same
player to have the same expectations about the opponents.
Given a game in extensive form, the Harsanyi/Selten theory should not be directly
applied to its associated standard form g; rather, for each " > 0 that is su¢ciently
small, the theory should be applied to the uniform "-perturbation g" of the game. The
solution of g is obtained by taking the limit, as " tends to zero, of the solution of g".
The question of whether the limit exists is not treated in Harsanyi and Selten (1988);
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the authors refer to the unpublished working paper Harsanyi and Selten (1977) in which
it is suggested that there should be no di¢culties. Formally, g" is de…ned as follows. For
each agent ij let ¾ij be the centroid of Aij , i.e. the strategy that chooses all pure actions
in Aij with probability jAijj¡1. For " > 0 su¢ciently small, write "ij = "jAijj and let
~" = ("ij)ij2H . Recall, from Equation (3.2) that s~";¾ denotes the strategy vector that
results when each player intends to play s, but players make mistakes with probabilities
determined by ~" and mistakes are given by ¾. The uniformly perturbed game g" is the
standard form game hA; u"iH where the payo¤ function u" is de…ned by u"i (s) = ui(s~";¾).
Hence, in g" each agent ij mistakenly chooses each action with probability " and the
total probability that agent ij makes a mistake is jAijj".
Let C be a collection of agents in a standard form game g and denote the complement of
C by ¹C. Given a strategy vector t for the agents in ¹C, write gtC = hA; utiC for the reduced
game faced by the agents in C when the agents in ¹C play t, hence utij(s) = uij(s; t) for
ij 2 C. Write gtC = gC and ut = uC in the special case where t is the centroid strategy
for each agent in ¹C. The set C is called cell in g if for each t and each player i with an
agent in C there exist constants ®i(t) > 0 and ¯i(t) 2 R such that
uti(s) = ®i(t)u
C
i (s) + ¯i(t) (for all s): (5.1)
Hence, if C is a cell, then up to positive linear transformations, the payo¤s to agents
in C are completely determined by the agents in C. Since the intersection of two cells
is again a cell whenever this intersection is nonempty, there exist minimal cells. Such
cells are called elementary cells. Two elementary cells have an empty intersection. Note
that for the special case of a normal form game (each player has only one agent), each
cell is a small world. Also note that a transformation as in (5.1) leaves the best-reply
structure unchanged. Hence, if we had de…ned a small world as a set of players whose
(admissible) best responses are not in‡uenced by outsiders, then each small world would
have been a cell. A solution concept that assigns to each standard form game g a unique
strategy vector f (g) is said to satisfy cell and truncation consistency if for each C that
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if ij 62 C:
(5.2)
The reader may check that a subgame of a uniformly perturbed extensive form game
induces a cell in the associated perturbed standard form; hence, the axiom of cell and
truncation consistency formalizes the idea that the solution is determined by backward
induction in the extensive form.
If g is a standard form game and Bij is a nonempty set of actions for each agent ij, then
B = XijBij is called a formation if for each agent ij, each best response against any
correlated strategy that only puts probability on actions in B belongs to Bij . Hence, in
normal form games, formations are just like curb sets (cf. Section 2.2), the only di¤erence
being that formations allow for correlated beliefs. As the intersection of two formations
is again a formation, we can speak about primitive formations, i.e. formations that do
not contain a proper subformation.
An action a of an agent ij is said to be inferior if there exists another action b of this
agent that is a best reply against a strictly larger set of (possibly) correlated beliefs
of the agents. Hence, noninferiority corresponds to the concept of robustness that we
encountered (for the case of independent beliefs) in Section 4.5. Any strategy that is
weakly dominated is inferior, but the converse need not hold.
Using the concepts introduced above, we can now describe the main steps employed in
the Harsanyi/Selten solution procedure:
1. Initialization: Form the standard normal form g of the game, and, for each " > 0
that is su¢ciently small, compute the uniformly perturbed game g"; compute the
solution f(g") according to the steps described below and put f(g) = lim
"#0
f (g").
2. Decomposition: Decompose the game into its elementary cells; compute the solu-
tion of an indecomposable game according to the steps described below and form
the solution of the overall game by using cell and truncation consistency.
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3. Reduction: Reduce the game by using the next three operations:.
(i) Eliminate all inferior actions of all agents.
(ii) Replace each set of equivalent actions of each agent ij (i.e. actions among
which all players are indi¤erent) by the centroid of that set.
(iii) Replace, for each agent ij, each set of ij-equivalent actions (i.e. actions
among which ij is indi¤erent no matter what the others do) by the centroid
strategy of that set.
By applying these steps, an irreducible game results. The solution of such a game
is by means of Step 4.
4. Solution:
(i) Initialization: Split the game into its primitive formations and determine
the solution of each basic game associated with each primitive formation by
applying the tracing procedure to the centroid of that formation. The set of
all these solutions constitutes the …rst candidate set -1.
(ii) Candidate elimination and substitution: Given a candidate set -, determine
the setM(-) of maximally stable elements in -. These are those equilibria in
- that are least dominated in -. Dominance involves both payo¤ dominance
and risk dominance and payo¤ dominance ranks more important than risk
dominance. The latter is de…ned by means of the tracing procedure (see
below) and need not be transitive. Form the chain - = -1;-t+1 = M(-t)
until -T+1 = -T . If j-T j = 1, then -T is the solution, otherwise replace
-T by the trace, t(-T ), of its centroid and repeat the process with the new
candidate set - = -T¡1n-T [ ft(-T )g.
It should be noted that it may be necessary to go through these steps repeatedly. Fur-
thermore, the steps are hierarchically ordered, i.e. if the application of Step 3(i) (i.e. the
elimination of inferior actions) results in a decomposable game, one should …rst return
to Step 2. The reader is referred to the ‡ow chart on p. 127 of Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) for further details.
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The next two sections of the present paper are devoted to Step 4, the core of the solution
procedure. We conclude this subsection with some remarks on the other steps.
We already discussed Step 2, as well as the reliance on the agent normal form in the
previous subsection. Deriving the solution of an unperturbed game as a limit of solu-
tions of uniformly perturbed games has several consequences that might be considered
undesirable. For one, duplicating strategies in the unperturbed game may have an e¤ect
on the outcome. Consider the normal form of the game from Figure 6. If we duplicate
the strategy pl1 of player 1, the limit solution prescribes r2 for player 2 (since the mis-
take pl1 is more likely than the mistake pr1), but if we duplicate pr1 then the solution
prescribes player 2 to choose l2. Hence, the Harsanyi/Selten solution does not satisfy
the invariance requirement (I) from Section 4.2, nor does it satisfy (IIA). Secondly, an
action that is dominated in the unperturbed game need no longer be dominated in the "-
perturbed version of the game and, consequently, it is possible to construct an example
in which the Harsanyi/Selten solution is an equilibrium that uses dominated strategies
(Van Damme (1990)). Hence, the Harsanyi/Selten solution violates (A). Turning now
to the reduction step, we note that the elimination procedure implies that invariance is
violated. (Cf. the discussion on persistency in Section 4.5; note that any pure strategy
that is a mixture of non-equivalent pure strategies is inferior.) Let us also remark that
stable sets need not survive when an inferior strategy is eliminated. (See Van Damme
(1987a, Figure 10.3.1) for an example.) Finally, we note that since the Harsanyi/Selten
theory makes use of payo¤ comparisons of equilibria, the solution of that theory is not
best reply invariant. We return to this below.
5.2 Risk dominance in 2£ 2 games
The core of the Harsanyi/Selten theory of equilibrium selection consists of a procedure
that selects, in each situation in which it is common knowledge among the players that
there are only two viable solution candidates, one of these candidates as the actual
solution for that situation. A simple example of a game with two obvious solution can-
didates (viz. the strict equilibria (a; a) and (¹a; ¹a)) is the stag-hunt game of the left-hand
panel of Figure 10, which is a slight modi…cation of a game …rst discussed in Aumann
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(1990). (The only reason to discuss this variant is to be able to draw simpler pictures).
a ¹a
a 4; 4 0; 3
¹a 3; 0 2; 2
a ¹a
a 4; 4 0; x+ 1


















Figure 10: The stag hunt
The stag hunt from the left-hand panel is a symmetric game with common interests
(Aumann and Sorin (1989)), i.e. it has (a; a) as the unique Pareto e¢cient outcome.
Playing a, however, is quite risky: If the opponent plays his alternative equilibrium
strategy ¹a, the payo¤ is only zero. Playing ¹a is much safer: one is guaranteed the
equilibrium payo¤ and, if the opponent deviates, the payo¤ is even higher. Harsanyi
and Selten discuss a variant of this game extensively since it is a case where the two
selection criteria that are used in their theory (viz. those of payo¤ dominance and risk
dominance) point in opposite directions. (See Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp. 88-89,
and 358-359).) Obviously, if each player could trust the other to play a, he would also
play a, and players clearly prefer such mutual trust to exist. The question, however, is
under which conditions such trust exists and how it can be created if it does not exist.
As Aumann (1990) has argued, preplay communication cannot create trust where it
does not exist initially. In the end, Harsanyi and Selten decide to give precedence to the
payo¤ dominance criterion, i.e. they assume that rational players can rely on collective
rationality and they select (a; a) in the game of Figure 10. However, the arguments given
are not fully convincing. We will use the game of Figure 10 to illustrate the concept of
risk dominance, which is based on strictly individualistic rationality considerations.
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Intuitively, the equilibrium s risk dominates the equilibrium ¹s if, when players are in
a state of mind where they think that either s or ¹s should be played, they eventually
come to the conclusion that ¹s is too risky and, hence, they should play s. For general
games, risk dominance is de…ned by means of the tracing procedure. For the special
case of 2-player 2£ 2 normal form games with two strict equilibria, the concept is also
given an axiomatic foundation. Before discussing this axiomatization, we …rst illustrate
how riskiness of an equilibrium can be measured in 2£ 2 games.
Let G(a; ¹a) be the set of all 2-player normal form games in which each player i has the
strategy set fa; ¹ag available and in which (a; a) and (¹a; ¹a) are strict Nash equilibria. For
g 2 G(a; ¹a), we identify a mixed strategy of player i with the probability ai that this
strategy assigns to a and we write ¹ai = 1¡ai. We also write di(a) for the loss that player
i incurs when he unilaterally deviates from (a; a) (hence, d1(a) = u1(a; a)¡u1(¹a; a)) and
we de…ne di(¹a) similarly. Note that when player j plays a with probability a¤j given by
a¤j = di(¹a)=(di(a) + di(¹a)); (5.3)
player i is indi¤erent between a and ¹a. Hence, the probability a¤j as in (5.3) represents
the risk that i is willing to take at (¹a; ¹a)) before he …nds it optimal to switch to a. In






1) is a natural
measure of the riskiness of the equilibrium (¹a; ¹a) (resp. (a; a)) and (¹a; ¹a) is more risky if
a¤1 < ¹a
¤





. In the game of Figure 10, we have that a¤1 =
2
3
, hence (a; a)
is more risky than (¹a; ¹a). More generally, let us measure the riskiness of an equilibrium
as the sum of the players’ risks. Formally, say that (a; a) risk dominates (¹a; ¹a) in g
(abbreviated a Âg ¹a) if
a¤1 + a
¤
2 < 1; (5.4)
say that (¹a; ¹a) risk dominates (a; a) (written ¹a Âg a) if the reverse strict inequality
holds, and say that there is no dominance relationship between (a; a) and (¹a; ¹a)) (written
a »g ¹a) if (5.4) holds with equality. In the game of Figure 10, we have that (¹a; ¹a) risk
dominates (a; a).
To show that these de…nitions are not “ad hoc”, we now give an axiomatization of risk-
dominance. On the class G(a; ¹a), Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Section 3.9) characterize
this relation by the following axioms.
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1. (Asymmetry and completeness): For each g exactly one of the following holds:
a Âg ¹a or ¹a Âg a or a »g ¹a.
2. (Symmetry): If g is symmetric and player i prefers (a; a) while player j(j 6= i)
prefers (¹a; ¹a), then a »g ¹a.
3. (Best-reply invariance): If g and g0 have the same best-reply correspondence, then
a Âg ¹a, if and only if a Âg0 ¹a.
4. (Payo¤ monotonicity): If g0 results from g by making (a; a) more attractive for
some player i while keeping all other payo¤s the same, then a Âg0 ¹a whenever
a Âg ¹a or a »g ¹a.
The proof is simple and follows from the observations that
(i) games are best-reply-equivalent if and only if they have the same (a¤1; a
¤
2),
(ii) symmetric games with con‡icting interests satisfy (5.4) with equality, and
(iii) increasing ui(a; a) decreases a¤j .
Harsanyi/Selten also give an alternative characterization of risk-dominance. Condition
(5.4) is equivalent to the (Nash) product of players’ deviation losses at (a; a) being larger
than the corresponding Nash product at (¹a; ¹a), hence
d1(a)d2(a) > d1(¹a)d2(¹a) (5.5)
and, in fact, the original de…nition is by means of this inequality. Yet another equivalent
characterization is that the area of the stability region of (a; a) (i.e. the set of mixed
strategies against which a is a best response for each player) is larger than the area
of the stability region of (¹a; ¹a): (Obviously, the …rst area is ¹a¤1¹a
¤





For the stag hunt game, the stability regions have been displayed in the middle panel
of Figure 10. (The diagonal represents the line a1 + a2 = 1; the upper left corner of
the diagram is the point a1 = 1, a2 = 1, it corresponds to the upper left corner of the
matrix, and similarly for other points.)
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In Carlsson and Van Damme (1993a), equilibrium selection according to the risk-dominance
criterion is derived from considerations related to uncertainty concerning the payo¤s of
the game. These authors assume that players can observe the payo¤s in a game only with
some noise. In contrast to Harsanyi’s model that was discussed in Section 2.5, Carlsson
and Van Damme assume that each player is uncertain about both players’ payo¤s. Be-
cause of the noise, the actual best-reply structure will not be common knowledge and
as a consequence of this lack of common knowledge, players’ behavior at each observa-
tion may be governed by the behavior at some remote observation (also cf. Rubinstein
(1989)). In the noisy version of the stag hunt game of Figure 8, even though players
may know to a very high degree that (a; a) is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, they
might be unwilling to play it since each player i might think that j will play ¹a since i
will think that j will think ... that ¹a is a dominant action. Hence, even though this
model super…cially resembles that of Harsanyi (1973a), it leads to completely di¤erent
results.
As a simple and concrete illustration of the model, suppose that it is common knowledge
among the players that payo¤s are related to actions as in the right panel g(x) of Figure
10. A priori, players consider all values x 2 [¡1; 4] to be possible and they consider
all such values to be equally likely. (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993a) show that the
conclusion is robust with respect to such distributional assumptions, as well as with
respect to assumptions on the structure of the noise). Note that g(x) 2 G(a; ¹a) for
x 2 (0; 3), that a is a dominant strategy if x < 0 and that ¹a is dominant if x > 3.
Suppose now that players can observe the actual value of x that prevails only with
some slight noise. Speci…cally, assume player i observes xi = x+ "ei where x; e1; e2 are
independent and ei is uniformly distributed on [¡1; 1]. Obviously, if xi < ¡" (resp.
xi > 3+ "), player i will play a (resp. ¹a) since he knows that that action is dominant at
each actual value of x that corresponds to such an observation. Forcing players to play
their dominant actions at these observations will make a and ¹a dominant at a larger
set of observations and the process can be continued iteratively. Let x (resp. ¹x) be the
supremum (resp. in…mum) of the set of observations y for which each player i has a
(resp. ¹a) as an iteratively dominant action for each xi < y (resp. xi > y). Then there
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must be a player i who is indi¤erent between a and ¹a when he observes x (resp. ¹x).
Writing aj(xi) for the probability that i assigns to j playing a when he observes xi, we
can write the indi¤erence condition of player i at xi (approximately) as
4aj(xi) = aj(xi) + xi: (5.6)
Now, at xi = x, we have that aj(xi) is at least 12 because of our symmetry assumptions
and since j has a as an iteratively dominant strategy for each xj < x. Consequently,
x ¸ 3
2
. A symmetric argument establishes that ¹x  3
2
, hence x = ¹x = 3
2
, and each player
i should choose a if he observes xi < 32 while he should choose ¹a if xi >
3
2
. Hence, in the
noisy version of the game, each player should always play the risk-dominant equilibrium
of the game that corresponds to his observation.
To conclude this subsection, we remark that the concept of risk dominance also plays
an important role in the literature that derives Nash equilibrium as a stationary state
of processes of learning or evolution. Even though each Nash equilibrium may be a
stationary state of such a process, occasional experimentation or mutation may result
in only the risk-dominant equilibrium surviving in the long run: This equilibrium has
a larger stability region, hence, a larger basin of attraction, so that the process is more
easily trapped there and mutations have more di¢culty to upset it (See Kandori et al.
(1993), Young (1993a,b), Ellison (1993)).
5.3 Risk dominance and the tracing procedure
Let us now consider a more general normal form game g = hA; ui where the players
are uncertain which of two equilibria, s or ¹s, should be played. Risk dominance tries to
capture the idea that in this state of confusion the players enter a process of expectation
formation that converges on that equilibrium which is the least risky of the two. (Note
that a player i with si = ¹si is not confused at all. Harsanyi and Selten …rst eliminate all
such players before making risk comparisons. For the remaining players they similarly
delete strategies not in the formation spanned by s and ¹s since these are never best
responses, no matter what expectations the players have. To the smaller game that
results in this way, one should then …rst apply the decomposition and reduction steps
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from Section 5.2. We’ll assume that all these transformations have been made and we
will denote the resulting game again by g:)
Harsanyi and Selten view the rational formation of expectations as a two-stage process.
In the …rst stage, players form preliminary expectations which are based on the struc-
ture of the game. These preliminary expectations take the form of a mixed strategy
vector s0 for the game. On the basis of s0, players can already form plans about how
to play the game. A naive plan would be for each player to play the best response
against s0, but, of course, these plans are not necessarily consistent with the prelimi-
nary expectations. The second stage of the expectation formation process then consists
of a procedure that gradually adjusts plans and expectations until they are consistent
and yield an equilibrium of the game g. Harsanyi and Selten actually make use of two
adjustment processes, the linear tracing procedure T and the logarithmic tracing pro-
cedure ~T . Formally, each of these is a map that assigns to a mixed strategy vector s0
exactly one equilibrium of g. The linear tracing procedure is easier to work with, but it
is not always well-de…ned. The logarithmic tracing procedure is well-de…ned and yields
the same outcome as the linear one whenever the latter is well-de…ned. We now …rst
discuss these tracing procedures. Thereafter, we return to the question of how to form
the preliminary expectations and how to de…ne risk dominance for general games.
Let g = hA; ui be a normal form game and let p be a vector of mixed strategies for
g, interpreted as the players’ prior expectations. For t 2 [0; 1] de…ne the game gt;p =
hA;ut;pi by
ut;pi = tui(s) + (1¡ t)ui(pnsi): (5.7)
Hence, for t = 1 the game coincides with g, while g0;p is a trivial game in which each
player’s payo¤ depends only on this player’s prior expectations, not on what the oppo-
nents are actually doing. Write ¡(p) for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence,
hence
¡(p) = f(t; s) 2 [0; 1]£ S : s is an equilibrium of gt;pg: (5.8)
In nondegenerate cases, g0;p will have exactly one (and strict) equilibrium s(0; p) and this
equilibrium will remain an equilibrium for su¢ciently small t. Let us denote it by s(t; p).
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The linear tracing procedure now consists in following the curve s(t; p) until, at its
endpoint T (p) = s(1; p), an equilibrium of g is reached. Hence, as the tracing procedure
progresses, plans and expectations are continuously adjusted until an equilibrium is
reached. The parameter t may be interpreted as the degree of con…dence players have
in the solution s(t; p). Formally, the linear tracing procedure with prior p is well-de…ned
if the graph ¡(p) contains a unique connected curve that contains endpoints both at
t = 0 and t = 1. In this case, the endpoint T (p) at t = 1 is called the linear trace of p.
(Note the requirement that there be a unique connecting curve. Herings (2000) shows
that there will always be at least one such curve, hence, the procedure is feasible in
principle.)
We can illustrate the procedure by means of the stag hunt game from Figure 10. Write
pi for the prior probability that i plays a. If pi > 23 for i = 1; 2, then g
0;p has (a; a) as its
unique equilibrium and this strategy pair remains an equilibrium for all t. Furthermore,
for any t 2 [0; 1], (a; a) is disconnected in ¡(p) from any other equilibrium of gt;p. Hence,
in this case the linear tracing procedure is well-de…ned and we have T (p) = (a; a).
Similarly, T (p) = (¹a; ¹a) if pi < 23 for i = 1; 2. Next, assume p1 <
2
3
and p2 > 23 so that
s(0; p) = (a; ¹a). In this case the initial plans do not constitute an equilibrium of the
…nal game so that adjustments have to take place along the path. The strategy pair
(a; ¹a) remains an equilibrium of gt;p as long as
4(1¡ t)p2 ¸ 2t+ (1¡ t)(2 + p2) (5.9)
and
(1¡ t)(2 + p1) + 3t ¸ 4p1(1¡ t) + 4t: (5.10)
Hence, provided that no player switches before t, player 1 has to switch at the value of
t given by
t=(1¡ t) = (3p2 ¡ 2)=2 (5.11)
while player 2 has to switch when
t=(1¡ t) = 2¡ 3p1: (5.12)
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Assume p1+ p2=2 < 1 so that the t-value determined by (5.11) is smaller than the value
determined by (5.12). Hence, player 1 has to switch …rst and, following the branch
(a; ¹a), the linear tracing procedure continues with a branch (¹a; ¹a). Since (¹a; ¹a) is a strict
equilibrium of g, this branch continues until t = 1, hence T (p) = (¹a; ¹a) in this case.
Similarly, T (p) = (a; a) if p1 < 23 ; p2 >
2
3
and p1 + p2=2 > 1. In the case where p1 > 23
and p2 < 23 , the linear trace of p follows by symmetry. The results of our computations












Figure 11a: In the interior of Figure 11b: A case where the linear
the shaded area T (p) = (a; a). tracing procedure is not well-de…ned.
In the interior of the comple-
ment T (p) = (¹a; ¹a):
If p1 < 23 ; p2 >
2
3
and p1 + p2=2 = 1, then the equations (5.11)-(5.12) determine the
same t-value, hence, both players want to switch at the same time ~t. In this case, the
game g~t;p is degenerate with equilibria both at (a; a) and at (¹a; ¹a). Now there exists
a path in ¡ that connects (a; ¹a) with (a; a) as well as a path that connects (a; ¹a) with
(¹a; ¹a). In fact, all three equilibria of g (including the mixed one) are connected to the
equilibrium of g0;p, hence, the linear tracing procedure is not well-de…ned in this case.
Figure 11b gives a graphical display of this case. (The picture is drawn for the case
where p1 = 12 ; p2 = 1 and displays the probability of 1 choosing a:)
The logarithmic tracing procedure has been designed to resolve ambiguities such as
those in Figure 11b. For " 2 (0; 1]; t 2 [0; 1) and p 2 S, de…ne the game g";t;p by means
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of
u";t;pi (s) = u
t;p












Hence, u";t;pi (s) results from adding a logarithmic penalty term to u
t;p
i (s). This term
ensures that all equilibria are completely mixed and that there is a unique equilibrium
s("; 0; p) if t = 0. Write ~¡(p) for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence
~¡(p) = f("; t; s) 2 (0; 1]£ [0; 1)£ S : s is an equilibrium of g";t;pg: (5.15)
~¡(p) is the zero set of a polynomial and, hence, is an algebraic set. Loosely speaking,
the logarithmic tracing procedure consists of following, for each " > 0, the analytic con-
tinuation s("; t; p) of s("; 0; p) till t = 1 and then taking the limit, as " ! 0, of the
end points. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Harsanyi (1975) claim that this construc-
tion can indeed be carried out, but Schanuel et al. (1991) pointed to some di¢culties
in this construction: The analytic continuation need not be a curve and there is no
reason for the limit to exist. Fortunately, these authors also showed that, apart from
a …nite set E of "-values, the construction proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is indeed
feasible. Speci…cally, if " 62 E, then there exists a unique analytic curve in ~¡(p) that
contains s("; 0; p). If we write s("; t; p) for the strategy component of this curve, then




s("; t; p) exists. ~T (p) is called the logarithmic trace of p. Hence, the
logarithmic tracing procedure is well-de…ned. Furthermore, Schanuel et al. (1991) show
that there exists a connected curve in ¡(p) connecting ~T (p) to an equilibrium in g0;p
implying that ~T (p) = T (p) whenever the latter is well-de…ned. Hence, we have
Theorem 13 (Harsanyi (1975), Schanuel et al. (1991)). The logarithmic tracing pro-
cedure ~T is well-de…ned. The linear tracing procedure T is well-de…ned for almost all
priors and ~T (p) = T (p) whenever the latter is well-de…ned.
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The logarithmic penalty term occurring in (5.13) gives players an incentive to use com-
pletely mixed strategies. It has the consequence that in Figure 11b the interior mixed
strategy path is approximated as " ! 0. Hence, if p is on the south-east boundary of the
shaded region in Figure 11a, then ~T (p) is the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game g.
We …nally come to the construction of the prior probability distribution p used in the risk
dominance comparison between s and ¹s. According to Harsanyi and Selten, each player
i will initially assume that his opponents already know whether s or ¹s is the solution.
Player i will assign a subjective probability zi to the solution being s and a probability
¹zi = 1 ¡ zi to the solution being ¹s. Given his beliefs zi player i will then choose a
best response bzii to the correlated strategy zis¡i + ¹zi¹s¡i of his opponents. (In case of
multiple best responses, i chooses all of them with the same probability.) An opponent
j of player i is assumed not to know i’s subjective probability zi; however, j knows
that i is following the above reasoning process. Applying the principle of insu¢cient
reasoning, Harsanyi/Selten assume that j considers all values of zi to be equally likely,
hence, j considers zi to be uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Consequently, j believes that




Equation (5.16) determines the players’ prior expectations p to be used for risk-dominance
comparison between s and ¹s. If ~T (p) = s (resp. ~T (p) = ¹s) then s is said to risk dominate
¹s (resp. ¹s risk dominates s). If ~T (p) 62 fs; ¹sg, neither equilibrium risk dominates the
other. The reader may verify that for 2 £ 2 games this de…nition of risk dominance is
in agreement with the one given in the previous section. For example, in the stag hunt
game from Figure 8 we have that bzii (a) = 1 if zi >
2
3







. Consequently, p lies in the non-shaded region in Figure 11a and T (p) = (¹a; ¹a),
hence, (¹a; ¹a) risk dominates (a; a).
Unfortunately, for games larger than 2 £ 2, the risk dominance relation need not be
transitive (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Figure 3.25) for an example) and selection
on the basis of this criterion need not be in agreement with selection on the basis of
stability with respect to payo¤ perturbations (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993b)). To
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illustrate the latter, consider the n-player stag hunt game in which each player i has the
strategy set fa; ¹ag. A player choosing a gets the payo¤ 1 if all players choose a, and 0
otherwise. A player choosing ¹a gets the payo¤ x 2 (0; 1) irrespective of what the others
do. There are two strict Nash equilibria, viz. “all a” and “all ¹a”. If player i assigns
prior probability z to his opponents playing the former, then he will play a if z > x,
hence, pi(a) = 1 ¡ x according to (5.16). Consequently, the risk-dominant solution is
“all a” if
(1¡ x)n¡1 > x (5.17)
and it is “all ¹a” if the reverse strict inequality is satis…ed. On the other hand, Carlsson
and Van Damme (1993b) derive that, whenever there is slight payo¤ uncertainty, a
player should play a if 1
n
> x. It is interesting to note that this n-person stag hunt
game has a potential (cf. Section 2.3) and that the solution identi…ed by Carlsson/Van
Damme maximizes the potential. More generally, suppose that, when there are k players
choosing a, the payo¤ to a player choosing a equals f(k) (with f(0) = 0, f (n) = 1) and
that the payo¤ to a player choosing ¹a equals x 2 (0; 1). Then the function p that assigns





is an exact potential for the game. “All a” maximizes the potential if and only if
kP
l=1
f(l)=n > x and this condition is identical to the one that Carlsson/Van Damme
derive for a to be optimal in their model.
To conclude this subsection, we remark that, in order to derive (5.16), it was assumed
that player i’s uncertainty can be represented by a correlated strategy of the opponents.
Güth (1985) argues that such correlated beliefs may re‡ect the strategic aspects rather
poorly and he gives an example to show that such a correlated belief may lead to
counterintuitive results. Güth suggests computing the prior as above, save by starting
from the assumption that i believes j 6= i to play zjsj + ¹zj¹sj with zj uniform on [0; 1]
and di¤erent z’s being independent.
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5.4 Risk dominance and payo¤ dominance
We already encountered the fundamental con‡ict between risk dominance and payo¤
dominance when discussing the stag hunt game in Section 5.2 (Figure 10). In that
game, the equilibrium (a; a) Pareto dominates the equilibrium (a; a), but the latter is
risk dominant. In cases of such con‡ict, Harsanyi/Selten have given precedence to the
payo¤ dominance criterion, but their arguments for doing so are not compelling, as they
indeed admit in the postscript of their book, when they discuss Aumann’s argument (also
already mentioned in Section 5.2) that pre-play communication cannot make a di¤erence
in this game. After all, no matter what a player intends to play he will always attempt to
induce the other to play a as he always bene…ts from this. Knowing this, the opponent
cannot attach speci…c meaning to the proposal to play (a; a), communication cannot
change a player’s beliefs about what the opponent will do and, hence, communication
can make no di¤erence to the outcome of the game (Aumann (1990)). As Harsanyi and
Selten (1988, p. 359) write “This shows that in general we cannot expect the players
to implement payo¤ dominance unless, from the very beginning, payo¤ dominance is
part of the rationality concept they are using. Free communication among the players
in itself might not help. Thus if one feels that payo¤ dominance is an essential aspect
of game-theoretic rationality, then one must explicitly incorporate it into one’s concept
of rationality”.
Several equilibrium concepts exist that explicity incorporate such considerations. The
most demanding concept is Aumann’s (1959) notion of a strong equilibrium: it requires
that no coalition can deviate in a way that makes all its members better o¤. Already
in simple examples such as the prisoners’ dilemma, this concept generates an empty
set of outcomes. (In fact, generically all Nash equilibria are ine¢cient (see Dubey
(1986)). Less demanding is the idea that the grand coalition not be able to renegotiate
to a more attractive stable outcome. This idea underlies the concept of renegotiation-
proof equilibrium from the literature on repeated games (see Bernheim and Ray (1989),
Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Van Damme (1988, 1989a)). Bernheim et al. (1987) have
proposed the interesting concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium as a formalization
of the requirement that no subcoalition should be able to pro…tably deviate to a strategy
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vector that is stable with respect to further renegotiation. The concept is de…ned for all
normal form games and the formal de…nition is by induction on the number of players.
For a one-person game any payo¤-maximizing action is de…ned to be coalition-proof.
For an I-person game, a strategy pro…le s is said to be weakly coalition-proof, if, for
any proper subcoalition coalition C of I , the strategy pro…le sC is coalition-proof in the
reduced game in which the complement C is restricted to play sC , and s is said to be
coalition-proof if there is no other weakly-coalition proof pro…le s0 that strictly Pareto
dominates it. For 2-player games, coalition-proof equilibria exist, but existence for
larger games is not guaranteed. Furthermore, coalition-proof equilibria may be Pareto
dominated by other equilibria.
The tension between “global” payo¤ dominance and “local” e¢ciency was already
pointed out in Harsanyi and Selten (1988): an agreement on a Pareto-e¢cient equi-
librium may not be self-enforcing since, with the agreement in place, and accepting the
logic of the concept, a subcoalition may deviate to an even more pro…table agreement.
The following provides a simple example. Consider the 3-player game g in which player
3 …rst decides whether to take up an outside option T (which yields all players the payo¤
1) or to let players 1 and 2 play a subgame in which the payo¤s are as in Figure 12.
a ¹a
a 2; 2; 2 0; 0; 0
¹a 0; 0; 0 3; 3; 0
Figure 12: Renegotiation as a constraint
The game g from Figure 12 has two Nash equilibrium outcomes. In the …rst, player 3
chooses T (in the belief that 1 and 2 will choose ¹a with su¢ciently high probability); in
the second, player 3 chooses p, i.e. he gives the move to players 1 and 2, who play (a; a).
Both outcomes are subgame perfect (even stable) and the equilibrium (a; a; p) Pareto
dominates the equilibrium T . At the beginning of the game it seems in the interest of
all players to play (a; a; p). However, once player 3 has made his move, his interests have
become strategically irrelevant and it is in the interest of players 1 and 2 to renegotiate
to (¹a; ¹a).
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Although the above argument was couched in terms of the extensive form of the game,
it is equally relevant for the case in which the game is given in strategic form, i.e. when
players have to move simultaneously. After agreeing to play (a; a; p), players 1 and 2
could secretly get together and arrange a joint deviation to (¹a; ¹a). This deviation is in
their interest and it is stable since no further deviations by subgroups are pro…table.
Hence, the pro…le (a; a; p) is not coalition-proof.
The reader may argue that these “cooperative re…nements” in which coalitions of play-
ers are allowed to deviate jointly have no place in the theory of strategic equilibrium,
and that, as suggested in Nash (1953), it is preferable to stay squarely within the
non-cooperative framework and to fully incorporate possibilities for communication and
cooperation in the game rather than in the solution concept. The present author agrees
with that view. The above discussion has been included to show that, while it is tempting
to argue that equilibria that are Pareto-inferior should be discarded, this view encoun-
ters di¢culties and may not stand up to closer scrutinity. Nevertheless, the shortcut
may sometimes yield valuable insights. The interested reader is referred to Bernheim
and Whinston (1987) for some applications using the shortcut of coalition-proofness.
5.5 Applications and variations
Nash (1953) already noted the need for a theory of equilibrium selection for the study
of bargaining. He wrote: “Thus the equilibrium points do not lead us immediately to
a solution of the game. But if we discriminate between them by studying their relative
stabilities we can escape from this troublesome nonuniqueness” (Nash (1953, pp. 131-
132)). Nash studied 2-person bargaining games in which the players simultaneously
make payo¤ demands, and in which each player receives his demand if and only if the
pair of demands is feasible. Since each pair that is just compatible (i.e. is Pareto
optimal) is a strict equilibrium, there are multiple equilibria. Using a perturbation
argument, Nash suggested taking that equilibrium in which the product of the utility
gains is largest as the solution of the game. The desire to have a solution with this
“Nash product property” has been an important guiding principle for Harsanyi and
Selten when developing their theory (cf. (5.5)). One of the …rst applications of that
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theory was to unanimity games, i.e. games in which each player’s payo¤ is zero unless
all players simultaneously choose the same alternative. As the reader can easily verify,
the Harsanyi/Selten solution of such a game is indeed the outcome in which the product
of the payo¤s is largest, provided that there is such a unique maximizing outcome.
Another early application of the theory was to market entry games (Selten and Güth
(1982)). In such a game there are I players who simultaneously decide whether to enter
a market or not. If k players enter, the payo¤ to a player i that enters is ¼(k)¡ci, while
his payo¤ is zero otherwise (¼ is a decreasing function). The Harsanyi/Selten solution
prescribes entry of the players with the lowest entry costs up to the point where entry
becomes unpro…table.
The Harsanyi/Selten theory has been extensively applied to bargaining problems (cf.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Chs. 6-9), Harsanyi (1980, 1982), Leopold-Wildenburger
(1985), Selten and Güth (1991), Selten and Leopold (1983)). Such problems are mod-
elled as unanimity games, i.e. a set of possible agreements is speci…ed, players simul-
taneously choose an agreement and an agreement is implemented if and only if it is
chosen by all players. In case there is no agreement, trade does not take place. For
example, consider bargaining between two risk-neutral players about how to divide one
dollar and suppose that one of the players, say player 1, has an outside option of ®.




) to player 1 and the rest to player 2.
Hence, the outside option in‡uences the outcome only if it is su¢ciently high (Harsanyi
and Selten (1988, Ch. 6)). As another example, consider bargaining between one seller
and n identical buyers about the sale of an indivisible object. If the seller’s value is 0
and each buyer’s value is 1, the Harsanyi/Selten solution is that each player proposes a
sale at the price p(n) = (2n ¡ 1)=(2n ¡ 1 + n).
Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Chs. 8 and 9) apply the theory to simple bargaining games
with incomplete information. Players bargain about how to divide one dollar; if there is
disagreement, a player receives his con‡ict payo¤, which may be either 0 or x (both with
probability 1
2
)) and which is private information. In the case of one-sided incomplete
information (it is common knowledge that player 1’s con‡ict payo¤ is zero), player 1
proposes that he get a share x(®) of the cake, where x(®) is some decreasing square root
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function of ® with x(0) = 50. The weak type of player 2 (i.e. the one with con‡ict payo¤
0) proposes that player 1 get x(®), while the strong type proposes x(®) if ® < ®¤(¼ 81)
and 0 in case ® > ®¤. Hence, the bargaining outcome may be ex post ine¢cient.
Güth and Selten (1971) consider a simple version of Akerlof’s lemons problem (Akerlof
(1970)). A seller and a buyer are bargaining about the price of an object of art, which
may be either worth 0 to each of them (it is a forgery) or which may be worth 1 to the
seller and v > 1 to the buyer. The seller knows whether the object is original or fake,
but the buyer only knows that both possibilities have positive probability. The solution
either is disagreement, or exploitation of the buyer by the seller (i.e. the price equals
the buyer’s expected value), or some compromise in which the buyer bears a greater
part of the fake risk than the seller does. At some parameter values, the solution (the
price) changes discontinuously, and Güth/Selten admit that they cannot give plausible
intuitive interpretations for these jumps.
Van Damme and Güth (1991a,b) apply the Harsanyi/Selten theory to signalling games.
In Van Damme and Güth (1991a) the most simple version of the Spence (1973) sig-
nalling game is considered. There are two types of workers, one productive, the other
unproductive, who di¤er in their education costs and who can use the education level
to signal their type to uninformed employers who compete in prices à la Bertrand. It
turns out that the Harsanyi/Selten solution coincides with the E2-equilibrium that was
proposed in Wilson (1977). Hence, the solution is the sequential equilibrium that is
most preferred by the high quality worker, and this worker signals his type if and only
if signalling yields higher utility than pooling with the unproductive worker does. It is
worth remarking that this solution is obtained without invoking payo¤ dominance. Note
that the solution is again discontinuous in the parameter of the problem, i.e. in the ex
ante probability that the worker is productive. The discontinuity arises at points where
a di¤erent element of the Harsanyi/Selten solution procedure has to be invoked. Specif-
ically, if the probability of the worker being unproductive is small, then there is only
one primitive formation and this contains only the Pareto-optimal pooling equilibrium.
As soon as this probability exceeds a certain threshold, however, also the formation
spanned by the Pareto-optimal separating equilibrium is primitive, and, since the sepa-
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rating equilibrium risk dominates the pooling equilibrium, the solution is separating in
this case.
We conclude this subsection by mentioning some variations of the Harsanyi/Selten the-
ory that have recently been proposed. Güth and Kalkofen (1989) propose the ESBORA
theory, whose main di¤erence to the Harsanyi/Selten theory is that the (intransitive)
risk dominance relation is replaced by the transitive relation of resistance dominance.
The latter takes the intensity of the dominance relation into account. Formally, given
two equilibria s and s0, de…ne player i’s resistance at s against s0 as the largest probabil-
ity z such that, when each player j 6= i plays (1¡z)sj+zs0j, player i still prefers si to s0i.
Güth and Kalkofen propose ways to aggregate these individual resistances into a resis-
tance of s against s0 which can be measured by a number r(s; s0). The resistance against
s0 can then be represented by the vector R(s0) = hr(s; s0)is and Güth/Kalkofen propose
to select that equilibrium s0 for which the vector R(s0), written in nonincreasing order,
is lexicographically minimal. At present the ESBORA theory is still incomplete: The
individual resistances can be aggregated in various ways and the solution may depend
in an essential way on which aggregation procedure is adopted, as examples in Güth
and Kalkofen (1989) show (see also Güth (1992) for di¤erent aggregation procedures).
For a restricted class of games (speci…cally, bipolar games with linear incentives), Selten
(1995) proposes a set of axioms that determine a unique rule to aggregate the players
individual resistances into an overall measure of resistance (or risk) dominance. For 2£2
games, selection on the basis of this measure is in agreement with selection as in Section
5.2, but for larger games, this need no longer be true. In fact, for 2-player games with
incomplete information, selection according to the measure proposed in Selten (1995)
has close relations with selection according to the “Generalized Nash product” as in
Harsanyi and Selten (1972).
Finally, we mention that Harsanyi (1995) proposes to replace the bilateral risk compar-
isons between pairs of equilibria by a multilateral comparison involving all equilibria
that directly identi…es the least risky of all of them. He also proposes not to make
use of payo¤ comparisons, a suggestion that brings us back the to fundamental con‡ict
between payo¤ dominance and risk dominance that was discussed in Section 5.4.
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5.6 Final Remark
We end this Section and Chapter by mentioning a result from Norde et al. (1996) that
puts all the attempts to select a unique equilibrium in a di¤erent perspective. Recall
that in Section 2 we discussed the axiomatization of Nash equilibrium using the concept
of consistency, i.e. the idea that a solution of a game should induce a solution of any
reduced game in which some players are committed to play the solution. Norde et al.
(1996) show that if s is a Nash equilibrium of a game g, g can be embedded in a larger
game that only has s as an equilibrium, consequently consistency is incompatible with
equilibrium selection. More precisely, Norde et al. (1996) show that the only solution
concept that satis…es consistency, nonemptiness and one-person rationality is the Nash
concept itself, so that not only equilibrium selection, but even the attempt to re…ne the
Nash concept is frustrated if one insists on consistency.
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